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Abstract
Passive cooling systems sometimes use natural circulation, and they are not dependent on
emergency AC power or offsite power, which can make designs simpler through the
reduction of emergency power supplying infrastructure. The passive system approach can
lead to substantial simplification of the system as well as overall economic benefits, and
passive systems are believed to be less vulnerable to accidents by component failures and
human errors compared to active systems. The viewpoint that passive system design is
more reliable and more economical than active system design has become generally
accepted. However, passive systems have characteristics of a high level of uncertainty
and low driving force for purposes of heat removal phenomena. These characteristics of
passive systems can result in increasing system unreliability and may raise potential
remedial costs during a system's lifetime. This study presents a comprehensive
comparison of reliability and cost taking into account uncertainties and introduces the
concept of flexibility using the example of active and passive residual heat removal
systems in a PWR. The results show that the active system can have, for this particular
application, greater reliability than the passive system. Because the passive system is
economically optimized, its heat removal capacity is much smaller than that of the active
system. Thus, functional failure probability of the passive system has a greater impact on
overall system reliability than the active system. Moreover, considering the implications
of flexibility upon remedial costs, the active system may more economical than the
passive system because the active system has flexible design features for purposes of
increasing heat removal capacity.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Research Motivations and Objectives
The extended consideration of severe accidents and increased safety requirements in the
current reactor design has led to a growing consideration of passive systems. Passive
systems are characterized by their full reliance upon natural phenomena (e.g. gravity,
natural circulation) to carry out their designated safety functions. Innovative reactor
designs (e.g. APl1000 [AP1000, 2000] or ESBWR [ESBWR, 2003]) make use of passive
safety features to a large extent in combination with active safety or operational systems.
Because passive systems use natural circulation, they are not dependent upon emergency
AC power or offsite power, which can make designs simpler through reduction of the
emergency power supplying infrastructure. The passive system approach can lead to
substantial simplification as well as overall economic benefits to the system, and passive
systems can be less vulnerable to accidents caused by human error compared to active
systems. The viewpoint that passive system design is more reliable and more economic
than active system design has been generally accepted.
There are two arguments in opposition to this common understanding of passive systems:
The first argument is related to reliability issues with passive system performance.
Because the performance of passive systems is completely reliant upon natural circulation
caused by the density difference between heated/cooled sections of the cooling system, its
driving head is small and a small deviation from operating conditions like an increase of
flow resistive factors or disturbances in heat transfer rate can easily influence the whole
system performance.
The second argument is related to potential capital cost issues of passive systems. A
potential detrimental effect incurred by inconsistent safety performance of passive
designs may require an additional remedial capital cost after the power plant has been
built. A comprehensive comparison of active and passive systems should consider this
potential cost. Devine (2003) addresses this concept as flexibility, suggesting that passive
systems are less flexible than active ones. A systemic approach for the comparison of
active and passive design is necessary in order to explore the implication of these two
arguments.
This study proposes four evaluation elements for a comprehensive comparison of active
and passive design: unreliability cause, uncertainty, economies, and flexibility as shown
in Figure 1-1.
Traditional
Concerns
New
Concerns
Figure 1-1 Four Evaluation Elements. A Comprehensive Comparison is achieved by
incorporating new concerns (uncertainty and flexibility) into traditional concerns
(unreliability cause and economics).
This systemic approach has been achieved by reliability assessments taking into account
phenomenological uncertainty due to intrinsically low driving forces and by cost analysis
considering remedial costs due to flexibility features of both passive and active design.
The objectives of this study are to:
1. Measure and compare the reliability of active and passive systems considering
effects of uncertainty in leading to functional failures
2. Measure and compare the costs of active and passive systems considering
implications of flexibility upon system remedial costs.
It is worth noting that the purpose of this study is not to compare AP1000 or AP 600 to
evolutionary plants. This study uses AP1000 or AP600 as a starting point of design and
selected a 2-loop (under capacity) passive system to compare against a 2-loop active
system as a way of illustrating a method. More detailed analysis is needed to provide
passive vs. active conclusion.
1.2 Framework for the Comprehensive Evaluation on Reliability and Cost
Through the representation of the system on the reliability-cost plane, a comprehensive
comparison of active and passive systems can be achieved. Figure 1-2 shows a
framework for the evaluation of a system considering uncertainty and robustness which
require improving system reliability after systems are brought into operation.
ReliablCityaluatio|Uncertainty Robustness FlexibilityReliabiltyialuPAtin Evaluation Evaluation Evaluation
(Conventional PRA)
Functional Failure Remedial Cost &
I I Improved Reliability
Traditional Concerns New Concerns
Figure 1-2 Framework for the Comprehensive Evaluation on Reliability-Cost Plane
Figure 1-3 depicts an illustrative case for an application of the framework. First, initial
capital cost and reliability in terms of conventional PRA are evaluated and positioned in
the plane at point Sl (Figure 1-3). Second, taking into account uncertainty effects, the
system reliability is reduced (due to functional failure) and its position in the plane moves
from S 1 to S2. Third, low system robustness directs the system to a modification which
recovers the reduced reliability. Remedial cost and improved reliability are evaluated
based upon the modification, which moves system position in the plane from S2 to S3.
Finally, the system flexibility can be evaluated in terms of improved reliability and
required remedial cost.
Through the representation of both active and passive system trajectories on the
reliability-cost plane, this study can compare these two systems taking into account new
concerns such as uncertainty and flexibility.
Reliability
Without
Functional
Failure
(Conventional PRA)
With
Functional
Failure
System
U
oReliability
Improved
.-** lFlexibility
Remedial Cost
Cost
Figure 1-3 Representation of a system on Reliability-Cost
Uncertainty and Modification Effects (The figure is not to scale)
Plane considering
1.3 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 reviews the concept of uncertainty and introduces the concept of functional
failure, which measures the probability of system failure, taking into account the
interference between load and capacity.
Chapter 3 proposes a methodology for the evaluation of functional failure taking into
account uncertainty and heat removal capacity. A demonstration of the methodology is
performed by using a passive residual heat removal system in the PWR. The Stochastic
Response Surface Method (SRSM) [Isukapalli et al, 1998] is adapted to create a
computer simulation code and the Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) [Helton et al, 2003]
method is used to increase sampling efficiency. Functional failures for active and passive
designs considering multiple loop configurations are evaluated.
Chapter 4 reports a comprehensive comparison of the active and passive design. The
combined results of analysis for functional failure, hardware failure, human error, and
common cause failure are incorporated into this comprehensive comparison. The Fault
Tree (FT) analysis, the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) method
[NUREG/CR-1278], and the Multiple Greek Letter (MGL) method [Fleming et al, 1986]
are used in the analysis of hardware failure, human error, and common cause failure,
respectively.
A more explicit comparison that takes into account a cost analysis of these two systems is
presented in Chapter 5. The flexibility concept in nuclear safety systems is also defined
and quantified. In addition, a quantitative analysis of flexibility is performed through two
illustrative case studies.
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and presents recommendations for future work.
1.4 Contributions
A fundamental conceptual contribution of this thesis is in the development of a general
unified framework for evaluating functional failure taking into account the effects of
economic optimization and its application in realistic examples of residual heat removal
systems in PWRs. A unified methodological framework is established based upon the
exploration of previously developed methodology for the evaluation of functional failure.
Detailed investigations for each step of the unified methodology have been performed. A
new computational technique using the stochastic response surface method, which has
advantages in repetitive calculation and easy alterations of simulation conditions, has
been developed. In addition, this study introduces the importance measurement concept
to uncertainty evaluation and applies it to identification of influential parameters affecting
the total functional failure probability.
A comprehensive comparison of active and passive system reliability considering various
failure modes has been performed. Practical hardware and human error data are used in
this comprehensive comparison. In particular, two case studies considering pre-accident
human error are performed, and provide valuable insight on an often overlooked human-
related failure mode. The unreliability contribution according to active and passive
system configurations is presented and a reliability improvement tactic for each system
configuration is identified.
Moreover, this study explores a conceptual foundation of flexibility in nuclear safety
systems and incorporates the flexibility concept into the comparison of active and passive
systems. Extensive literature reviews are performed in order to investigate the flexibility
concept. The attempt to quantify flexibility is performed through a case study as an
illustrative example.
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Chapter 2 Uncertainty and Functional Failure
2.1 Uncertainty
It is common to classify the sources of uncertainty as aleatory and epistemic. Many
authors take the view that the distinction between the two uncertainties is of a more
practical than a theoretical significance. However, Winkler (1996) points out that all
uncertainty is quantified by probability, and that the classification of an uncertainty as
aleatory and epistemic is somewhat arbitrary. Apostolakis (1988) supports Winkler's
claim in his paper (1988). "Distinctions between probabilities (uncertainties) are merely
for our convenience in investigating complex phenomena."
However, for the practical purpose of investigating complex phenomena, we classified
uncertainties as being aleatory and epistemic depending on their characteristics.
Aleatory Uncertainty
Aleatory uncertainty arises because of natural, unpredictable variation, and stochastic
behavior in the performance of the system. The outcome of the toss of a coin or the time
of failure of a component might be viewed as an aleatory uncertainty. Aleatory
uncertainty is modeled by random variables or stochastic processes by probability theory
if information is sufficient to build probability distributions. Aleatory uncertainty can be
quantified by measurements and statistical estimations, or by expert opinion. Although
expert knowledge or detailed information may be useful in quantifying this uncertainty,
such knowledge or information cannot be expected to reduce aleatory uncertainty. Thus,
this type of uncertainty is sometimes referred to as irreducible uncertainty.
Epistemic Uncertainty
Epistemic uncertainty results from a lack of knowledge about the behavior of a system
whose behavior is conceptually resolvable. Epistemic uncertainty is associated with the
confidence of the analyst regarding the "goodness" of the model and the value of the
relevant parameters. Still, the key feature of epistemic uncertainty relies upon incomplete
information or incomplete knowledge of some characteristic of the system or the
environment. As a result, an increase in knowledge or information can lead to a reduction
in the predicted uncertainty of the response of the system. Epistemic uncertainty can, in
principle, be quantified by experts, but cannot be measured.
Epistemic uncertainty can be subdivided into two categories: parameter uncertainty and
model uncertainty.
Parameter Uncertainty
Parameter uncertainty is that associated with the 'true' numerical value of a parameter in
a mathematical model'. Mathematical models are used to describe the physical system
and they rely on the on the knowledge of the values of relevant parameters. These values
must be used as inputs in the model and might have a certain level of error range or
precision, which is associated with parameter uncertainty. In reliability or risk models,
the uncertainty of failure rates or event probabilities including human error corresponds
to parameter uncertainty [Modarres et al, 1999].
Model Uncertainty
Model uncertainty refers to deviations between the real world and its simplified
representation in models. These discrepancies are made by limitations in the analyst's
knowledge of relevant phenomena and deliberate simplifications introduced by the
analyst.
However, it is possible to account for some model uncertainty by incorporating a discrete
probability distribution with the reliability/risk model [Modarres et al, 1999]. On the
other hand, Zio and Apostolakis [1996] suggest the "adjustment factor approach" to
1 Often there is no strict physical or 'real-world' interpretation of the parameter in
question. Hence the notion of a 'true' value is at best hazy.
quantify the error in model predications. The principle of this approach is to employ the
best model available and compensate for the error by introducing additive or
multiplicative adjustment factors.
Model uncertainty also includes the fact that the model could be too simplified and
therefore would neglect some important phenomena affecting the final result. This type of
uncertainty is sometimes identified independently from model uncertainty [USNRC
1998] and is known as completeness uncertainty.
The following example illustrates each of these uncertainty concepts: a Poisson model
can be used for modeling a stochastic event which embodies inherent randomness, for
instance, an earthquake or the time of failure of a component. The variability associated
with the results obtained from this model represents the aleatory uncertainty. The
epistemic uncertainty, on the other hand, describes our state of knowledge about this
model. The uncertainty associated with the choice of the Poisson model itself (model
uncertainty) and its parameter A (parameter uncertainty) is considered epistemic.
2.2 Passive Safety Systems and their Functional Uncertainty
Following the IAEA definition [TECDOC, 1991], a Passive system is defined as either a
system which is composed of passive components and structures or a system which has
no reliance on external inputs (forces, power or signal, or human action) and uses active
components in a very limited way to imitate subsequent passive operation.
In this study, we focus on B type passive systems (i.e. those that implement a moving
working fluid, following IAEA classification [TECDOC, 1991]), which are also referred
to as Thermal-Hydraulic (T-H) Passive systems.
The type B passive systems are characterized by their full reliance upon natural
convection driven by the buoyancy force. The establishment of a temperature difference
between the heat source and heat sink further contributes to build up the buoyancy force.
Consequently, these passive systems utilize natural convection to perform their accident
prevention and mitigation functions once actuated and started.
These buoyancy forces are not generated by external power sources (e.g., pumped
systems), as is the case in operation of evolutionary reactor design. Hence, the magnitude
of the natural forces, which drive the operation of the passive systems, is relatively small.
As a result, the overall heat removal capacity of the passive systems is comparatively
small to that of active design. In addition, counter-forces (e.g., friction loss or form loss)
can be of comparable magnitude and cannot be ignored as is usually done with pumped
systems.
Moreover, considerable uncertainties are associated with factors on which the magnitude
of these forces and counter forces depend (e.g., values of heat transfer coefficients and
pressure losses). The magnitudes of such natural driving forces depend upon the specific
plant conditions and configurations (e.g., system pressure, decay power level, and
temperature of the heat sink) which could be presented at the time a system is called upon
to perform its safety function. All these uncertainties affect the passive system thermal-
hydraulic performance. For this reason, thermal-hydraulic passive system reliability must
be assessed.
Burgazzi (2007) classified two kind of uncertainties associated with passive system
performance. The first one is of an aleatory nature and concerns the randomness and
variability of properties and the latter is of epistemic nature and is related to our state of
knowledge about the important phenomena. The three broad categories of uncertainties to
be addressed are the following:
* Geometrical properties: Aleatory
* Material properties: Aleatory
* Phenomenological understanding: Epistemic
The first and second groups fall within the category of aleatory uncertainties because they
represent the stochastic variability of the analysis inputs. The third category refers to
epistemic uncertainties due to the lack of knowledge about the observed phenomena and
is thus suitable for reduction by gathering a relevant amount of information and data. This
class of uncertainties must be subjectively evaluated, since no complete investigation of
these uncertainties is available.
While passive systems are very sensitive to these impairing factors, active systems are
subject to the same phenomenological events and changes in environmental conditions
that depart from the system nominal behavior. However, active systems can cope with
these situations, shifting the operating points relatively more easily.
2.3 Functional Reliability of passive system
Uncertainties associated with this passive function should be incorporated into the
comprehensive evaluation of passive reliability. No commonly accepted practices exist so
far on how to estimate reliability of passive systems considering their uncertain physical
behavior in heat removal. The reliability of a passive system should include not only the
logical combination of components' reliability, as in classical approaches, but also the
reliability of passive functions.
Burgazzi (2003) proposed a structural mechanics-based application of a stress and
strength model in order to evaluate this passive functional reliability. In accordance with
passive systems, stress and strength may correspond to applied heat load and heat
removal capacity, respectively. Based on this model, a system or component fails if in a
particular steady state case the applied heat load exceeds the system or component's heat
removal capacity thereby resulting in hot channel overheating. For instance, a peak
cladding temperature (load) distribution could be evaluated depending on a passive heat
removal function taking into account environmental uncertainties. The passive function
can be regarded to fail when the peak cladding temperature exceeds a given reference
value or distribution (capacity), which is associated with mechanical strength or chemical
tolerance of cladding material.
Assuming independence between load and capacity, the numerical value of functional
failure probability can be represented as:
Pf = P(L > C) = [ fL(1)d C(c) dc (2-1)
where, fc(c) and fL(l) are the uncertainty distributions on the capacity and the load.
Figure 2-1 shows an illustration of load and capacity distribution and their corresponding
functional failure probability. For a graphical illustration purpose, we express the
functional failure probability as the common area between the two distributions. However,
the actual functional probability is represented by the convolution formula as shown in
Equation (2-1).
The inclusion of epistemic and aleatory uncertainties makes it possible to calculate the
probability of the load having a larger value than the capacity. In general, the value of
functional failure associates not only the magnitude of the variances (uncertainty) but
also the absolute distance between the load and capacity characteristic values. From a
practical perspective, the latter issue arises as an important detrimental factor in passive
design compared to conventional active design.
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Figure 2-1 Uncertainty on load and capacity and its functional failure
2.4 Probabilistic Model for the Quantification of Uncertainty
The justification for particular probability density functions of load and capacity and their
corresponding mean and variance should be made based upon the gathering and
evaluation of relevant information that can serve to characterize the nature of the random
data and physical processes.
However, the lack of a consistent database for both experimental and operating data
forces the adoption of elicitation/engineering assessment to a great extent, thus making
the results conditional upon the expert judgment elicitation process. This concerns the
choice of both the specific distribution function and the relative range. These assumptions
should be plausibly justified and finally one must qualify the results of the study.
Ricotti et al. (2002), use discrete values to simplify both the identification of parameter
ranges and their corresponding probabilities. Pagani et al. (2005) uses a normal
distribution with a mean value equal to unity and a standard deviation to be determined
corresponding to the correlation prediction error (model uncertainty) and empirical data
(parameter uncertainty). Mackay et al. (2008) quantified the uncertainty of six parameters
using normal, lognormal, and exponential distributions, which were selected based upon
sensitivity analysis and expert opinion.
2.5 Impacts of Epistemic Uncertainty to System Functional Failures
According to the concept of functional failure, a decrease of epistemic uncertainty leads
to an increase of safety margin, which leads to a decrease of failure probability. Namely,
even though a physical system does not change, an increase of knowledge can reduce the
failure probability of the system. This is consistent with the Bayesian interpretation of
probability which considers probability to be a measure of the degree of belief one holds
in a specified condition. Therefore, a probability value can always be changed according
to the change of state of knowledge of the system.
Epistemic
Uncertainty
High Medium Low
Uncertainty Uncertainty Uncertainty
FunctionalI I
Failure
Probability p p p
10-3 10-2 10-3  10-4 10-3  (probability)
STATE OF KNOWLEDGE IMPROVEMENT
Figure 2-2 Relationship of Epistemic uncertainty and Functional Failure
Pagani et al. (2005) effectively shows in Figure 2-2 these facts using three different states
of epistemic uncertainty. As the state of knowledge improves, epistemic uncertainty is
decreased (shadowed area), which leads to an increase of the safety margin as well as a
decrease in functional failure (solid black line).
2.6 Computational Challenges in Functional Failure Evaluation
In reality, system variables change changing according to time; thus, more accurate
evaluation of the propagation of uncertainty has to be investigated by a time dependent
simulation. 'Best estimated codes' such as RELAP5 or TRACE has to be used to simulate
time dependent system performance with randomly sampled sets of parameter
distributions. RMPS (2004) and Mackay et al. (2008) attempted to measure the
propagation of uncertainty using best estimated codes in terms of passive safety systems
in BWR, PWR, and GFR.
However, since the codes were originally developed for the purposed of turbulent flow
analysis of evolutionary reactors, these codes may have high uncertainty in analysis of
mixed or laminar flow regime, which passive systems can be subjected to. In addition, the
codes require a large amount of computational power and time in order to obtain several
I
case calculations. The RMPS project performed 69-100 different simulation cases for
each system and Mackay performed 128 simulation cases for passive systems in GFR
analysis.
The required number of simulations needed in order to get acceptable estimates in a
stochastic process is mentioned in Kirchsteiger (2005). As a rule of thumb, failure
probabilities Pf demand a sample size 2 of at least 1/Pf. Consequently, it may take a large
number of simulation cycles, mainly if the system is actually reliable (Pf= 10-3
N>103), to achieve relevant accuracy.
Several attempts to overcome this computational challenge have been made including:
* Variance reduction techniques in Monte-Carlo methods: e.g. Latin hypercube
sampling
* Approximated models: Response Surface method
* Simplification of the thermal hydraulic model: Steady state analysis
Variance reduction techniques offer an increase in the efficiency and accuracy of the
simulation-based assessment of the system reliability for a relatively small number of
simulation cases. Several variance reduction techniques exist: Importance sampling,
Stratified sampling, Latin hypercube sampling, and so on. Among these techniques, this
study uses Latin hypercube sampling and thereby reduces the number of simulations.
The approximated method fits the results of thermal hydraulic model and uses the fitting
function to accelerate the calculation procedure. A representative method is the response
surface method. This approach was attempted by Boyack (1989) to analyze the reliability
of a rod ejection accident. The main issue is that the response surface represents only an
2 The necessary sample size to obtain a probability estimate with good confidence is
around 100/Pr.
approximation of the original model output. The validation of this approximated model
concerns the specified region of interest and the number of fitting data used to establish
the response surface. The advantage of this method is that the proper manipulation of the
response surface can increase the calculation efficiency dramatically. However, the
drawback of this method is that it requires a high level of effort to create the response
surface.
Simplifying the thermal hydraulic model is based on the assumption that the time
dependent behavior of system finally reaches a steady state. The advantage of this
approach is given by that fact the approximations induced by the simplified model are
controlled by the analyst, and tractable results can be obtained with a simplified code
realization. However, it cannot properly model potential failures due to transient events.
These three approaches have been used in this analysis of passive residual heat removal
systems in PWR where a simplified thermal hydraulic model (steady state model) has
been coupled with the Latin hypercube sampling method and the response surface
method.
2.7 Inclusion of Functional Failure in System Reliability Evaluation
Once functional failure is evaluated, the inclusion of functional failure in the reliability
evaluation of the whole system should be considered. Complete system failure is
composed of the contribution of hardware failure, human error and functional failure.
Hardware failure and human error can be calculated by conventional PRA methods. On
other hand, we evaluate functional failure using the stress-strength model taking into
account epistemic uncertainty of the system using probability density functions of each
parameter.
Figure 2-3 Representation of Functional Failure in Fault Tree
The functional failure probability is that of the event, exclusive of all hardware failures or
human errors, overall system performance does not satisfy the success criteria of the
system. Functional failure is, namely, the combinational failure of unsatisfactory
unexpected system environments and physical phenomena.
In terms of the evaluation of hardware failure, the fault tree technique seems to be the
most suitable means to quantify failure probability. The conventional failure model
associated with the basic events (i.e. exponential, e- At, A failure rate, t mission time), is
commonly used for the evaluation of hardware failure. In order to account for dependent
failure, a common cause failure model should be introduced. Generally, passive systems
are credited to have fairly low hardware failure probability. However, in order to reduce
the likelihood of functional failure, and assuming that the multiple passive loops are
required to operate cooperatively, the contribution of hardware failure to the overall
system reliability cannot be ignored.
Human error can be divided into two categories: pre-accident human error and post-
accident human error. Generally, passive systems are credited with eliminating or
significantly reducing post-accident human errors. However, passive systems may be
expected to undergo maintenance/repair or in service inspection, with reference, for
instance, to heat exchanger broken or plugged tubes, or to water lines undergoing small
leakages. In this respect, human error (pre-accident) should be considered for its potential
to play an important role via periodic maintenance and inspection both of which can
significantly affect the system reliability [Burgazzi, 2006].
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Chapter 3 Methodology Development for Reliability Evaluation of
Natural Circulation
In this chapter, we describe a method for functional failure evaluation. First, a
comprehensive procedure of the methodology including qualitative and quantitative
analysis is presented. Next, the propagation of uncertainty through the use of a
computation model is performed. Then, the importance of uncertainties among
parameters is defined and evaluated. Finally, a comparison of the effects of functional
failure in active and passive design is presented.
In order to extract clear features of the proposed method, it is necessary to begin with an
overview of other methodologies that have been presented concerning the reliability of
passive systems.
3.1 Methodology overview
In recent years, several methodologies have been presented to measure the reliability of
passive systems taking into account uncertainty with respect to the process of natural
circulation.
In the late 1990s, a methodology known as REPAS3 was developed cooperatively by
ENEA 4, the University of Pisa, the Polytechnic of Milan and the University of Rome, that
later was incorporated into the EU RMPS 5 project [RMPS, 2004]. Burgazzi (2003)
proposed an application of a stress and strength model from structural mechanics in order
to evaluate the passive functional reliability in this project. Functional failure reliability
refers to the probability that a load exceeds the capacity of a system to perform a desired
function when uncertainties of its physical and geometric parameters are taken into
3 Reliability Evaluation of Passive Safety systems
4 Italian Commission for New Technologies, Energy and Environment
5 Reliability Method for Passive Safety
account.
The attempts to establish approximated models are made in the RMPS project.
First/second order reliability method, response surface method, and neural network
method are incorporated into the attempts. The small number of simulated results by use
of a best estimate code such as RELAP5, ATHLET and CATHARE are used for the
fitting sources of approximation method.
Code-to-code comparisons are performed between the best-estimate codes. Various
sampling methods are pursued in order to increase the computational efficiency. For the
identification of major failure modes and critical parameters, qualitative analyses have
been performed using the method of Failure Mode and Effective Analysis (FMEA) and
Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP).
RMPS has been a comprehensive project to measure the reliability of passive systems by
analyzing the various kinds of systems in terms of their thermal hydraulic principles.
However, the systemic guidelines or procedure for the determination of probability
distributions are not clearly explained and a more rigorous and systematic basis is
necessary to select the parameters that accurately characterize the system status in RMPS
work.
A similar approach has been followed at MIT in order to evaluate the functional failure of
gas cooled fast reactor (GFR) passive cooling systems given a loss of coolant accident
[Pagani et al, 2005]. Pagani (2005) attempted to model GFR functional failure using
simpler conservative codes that simulated steady states of the system and measured the
propagation of uncertainty using Monte Carlo techniques.
Pagani also clarified the impact of safety margins in safety systems with the comparison
of active and passive systems. According to the preliminary calculations by Pagani, the
reliability of passive systems may prove to be lower in comparison to that of an active
system if the functional failure caused by epistemic uncertainty is considered in the
overall failure probability.
On the contrary, Mackay [Mackay et al, 2008] modeled a GFR passive cooling system
using RELAP5. This model simulated the time-dependent performance of the system at
such a detailed level that one whole day was required to simulate one case. Mackay
(2008) found vulnerable operating modes of the passive cooling system and reflected this
finding to the improvements of GFR design. In addition, he found threshold effects and
evaluated their corresponding failure probabilities 6of the two independent failure modes.
These two methodologies have not yet been applied to real systems of innovative reactors.
Thus, the reliability values of each may vary significantly in accordance with design
strategies of the system and assumptions used in reliability assessment. Efforts to obtain
the true reliability value for each passive system are in progress.
Figure 3-1 show a simple flow diagram of each methodology used in evaluation of
functional failure probability. Through the examination of all methodologies, we observe
four essential steps which all of the methodologies utilize.
First, a system is modeled using proven or developed computer codes which embody
basic thermal hydraulic principles of natural circulation. For the time-dependent
simulations, best-estimated codes usually have been used in order to quantify the failure
probability of passive systems. On the other hand, in order to obtain steady state
simulations, simplified developed codes have been introduced in order to avoid the
complexity of proven codes and to reduce the simulation time and endeavors.
6 The probabilities of cladding damage and structure failure are 0.12 and 0.20,
respectively.
The second step in the procedure is the selection of critical parameters. These critical
parameters have been determined by qualitative analysis, expert opinions, literature
reviews, or through sensitivity analysis of the system.
RMPS Pagani Mackay Our Study
System
Identification
IComponent
Parameter Idenfication
Selection
P-"Parameter
Selection
Fai -1r
Evaluation
(Sensitivity
Analysis)
Figure 3-1 Flow diagram of methodologies of functional failure evaluation
On the third step, the uncertainties of these parameters are assigned using probabilistic
distributions, which represent the aleatory or epistemic uncertainty of parameter and
model. The quantification of these uncertainties can be performed by two methods. The
first is direct predictions of probability distributions. The second is an elicitation of error
range from expert judgments or available literature first, and then a representation of the
likelihoods of the values within the error range is performed via well-known distributions
such as the normal or log-normal using designated confidence levels. More systematic
and standard procedures to quantify the parameter and model uncertainty are typically
investigated through the latter method.
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Finally, the propagation of input uncertainty is performed in numerical simulations using
best estimate codes or simply developed codes. In order to define failure probability, the
use of appropriate failure criteria is required.
Table 3-1 Overview of methodologies for functional failures
Process Element RMPS Pagani Mackay
ICS/RP2/HA 7  GFR RHR GFR RHR
(transient) (steady state) (transient)
Simulation RELAP5 MATLAB RELAP5Code CATHARE
FMEA/HAZOP Prediction valuesParameter Selection values ensitivity analysisAHP Parameter values
Uncertainty LiteratureUantain Expert opinion LiteratureExpert opinionQuantification Industry practice
VariousVarious Latin Hypercube
Sampling Method Importance Monte Carlo Latin Hypercube
SamplingsSampling
Table 3-1 lists specific evaluation systems, programming codes, parameter selection, and
sampling methods corresponding to the proposed methodologies.
In this study, the approach of system modeling (the first step) is performed via
description of the physical system and thermal hydraulic modeling. Qualitative analysis is
used in order to determine uncertain parameters (the second step). The uncertainty of
selected parameter is quantified mainly using the predicted error range and its
corresponding normal distribution (the third step). Consequently, numerical simulation is
performed using a developed conservative code, which uses a basic concept of the
response surface method (the fourth step).
7 ICS: Isolation Condenser System, RP2: Residual Passive heat Removal system on the
Primary circuit, HA: Hydro-Accumulator system.
3.2 Physical System
In this work, we select a single phase Passive Residual Heat Removal systems (PRHR) as
a reference passive cooling system. This system is part of the design of Westinghouse
AP600 and AP1000. An attempt to analyze these sorts of systems, which rely on natural
circulation, has been made in the RMPS project using a conceptual PRHR system named
RP2. This thesis section presents the configuration of a reference design and its
operational principles.
3.2.1 Passive Residual Heat Removal System
The PRHR removes emergency core decay heat during transients, accidents, or whenever
the normal heat removal functions are lost. The system is designed to perform the
function properly without the supply of on-and off-site power and with few operator
actions under the events of loss of feedwater, feedwater line breaks, and steam line breaks.
One loop of the PRHR consists of one heat exchanger and associated valves, piping and
instruments. Figure 3-2 presents the basic configurations of a PRHR system.
RCP (trip)
Figure 3-2 Basic elevation conceptual diagram of a Passive Residual Heat Removal
system
* Legend of Figure 3-2
SG: Steam Generator, RX: Reactor, PZR: Pressurizer, RCP: Reactor Coolant Pump
IRWST: Internal Refueling Water Storage Tank, HX: Heat Exchanger,
AOV: Air-Operated Valve, MOV: Motor-Operated Valve
The heat exchanger is located in the in-containment refueling water storage tank
(IRWST), which provides the ultimate heat sink and induces natural circulation flow
when the reactor coolant pumps are not available. In normal operation, the heat
exchanger is maintained full of cold reactor coolant water at full RCS pressure [AP1000,
2000].
The inlet line of the cooling system is directed to the upper side of the heat exchanger
channel head and is connected to the top of the RCS hot leg. The motor operated valve is
open in normal operation. The discharge cooling system return line has air-operated flow
control valves that open on loss of air pressure or in response to an actuation signal. A
check valve is installed to allow flow in only one direction under natural circulation
conditions and to prevent flow from reactor coolant pump (RCP) under normal operations.
Under normal conditions, the water temperature in the heat exchanger is about the same
as the water in the IRWST, so that a thermal driving head is established and maintained
during normal system operation.
In case of the AP600 and AP1000, the heat exchanger discharge line is connected to the
suction of the reactor coolant pump (RCP), which allows actuation of the heat exchanger
with the RCP in operation. If the pump is operating and subsequently stops, then natural
circulation continues to provide the driving head for heat exchanger flow [AP1000, 2000].
The reference system of our research consists of two identical PRHR loops (Figure 3-3).
Each loop has a C-shaped vertically oriented tube heat exchanger which is located in the
same IRWST and removes the same amount of decay heat. If one of the loops is not
available such as in the case of valve failures or heat exchanger failures, one loop can
perform the other's heat removal task. However, in accordance with our preliminary
calculation presented in Section 3.8, the capacity of a single loop is not sufficient to
provide the entire needed removal of decay heat. An alternative design that increases the
capacity of one loop by means of increasing the size of the heat exchanger is vulnerable
to the failure of the check valve, which is located on the discharge line. We evaluated the
functional failure probability of three passive cooling configurations: using one loop, two
loops and three loops, respectively. Here, the increment of number of loops contributes
an increase of heat removal capacity, under condition of cooperative operation, rather
than an increase of operational redundancy.
Heat Exchanger #1 Heat Exchanger #2
Figure 3-3 Layout of the reference PRHR system, consisting of two identical PRHR
loops operating in parallel
8 The preliminary result of reliability to one loop passive cooling is about 0.72 and our
assumed decay power is 55 MWt
3.3 Thermal Hydraulic Model
The principle of natural circulation
Natural circulation in a fluid closed loop is established by locating a heat sink of the loop
at an elevation that is higher than the loop's heat source. The fluid in contact with the
heat source is heated and thus its density decreases. In a similar manner, the fluid density
of the heat sink increases. In this way, a fluid density difference is established in the loop.
This density difference, acted upon by gravity over the difference in elevation between
the source and the sink, produces a buoyancy force that drives the fluid through the loop.
Based upon this principle, the thermal hydraulic model of the PRHR is established and its
heat removal performance is evaluated in terms of system reliability.
Thermal hydraulic model of PRHR
The PRHR system loop consists of a heat source, heat sink and heat transfer loop which
correspond to the reactor core, heat exchanger, and connection piping respectively. Under
natural circulation conditions, the flow is driven entirely by the buoyancy-generated
pressure head.
The coolant is heated in the reactor core and cooled in the heat exchanger at a constant
heat removal rate (Q). The system model assumes a linear temperature increase in the
core and a linear temperature decrease in the heat exchanger both without heat loss or
addition in the circulation loop9.
In the heat source portion of the analysis, heat transfer takes place between fuel cladding
and low temperature coolant in accordance with a heat transfer coefficient (hcoRE) which
is determined by thermal properties and the mass flow rate in the core. In the heat sink,
heat transfer takes place between high temperature coolant and the surface of the heat
9 In actual reactor systems the spatial temperature increase in the core may not be linear,
and the temperature decrease in the heat exchanger may be closed to exponential.
exchanger in accordance with a heat transfer coefficient (hHx) which is determined by
thermal properties and the mass flow rate of the heat exchanger. The heat transfer
between the heat source and sink is performed by a direct circulation flow of coolant at a
stated heat capacity and mass flow rate. These three heat transfer rates mutually establish
an equilibrium reflected in the steady state of the system.
Low side temperature, high side temperature and average system temperature are denoted
by TL, TH, and Tsys, respectively. The heat exchanger wall temperature and the core
cladding temperature are denoted by TLW and THW, respectively. The exit wall
temperature of the heat exchanger and exit wall temperature of reactor core refer to TLWE
and THWE, respectively (Figure 3-4).
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Figure 3-4 The Schematic Diagram of Relationships within Simplified Thermal
Hydraulic Model of PRHR
The mass flow rate and system temperature are determined by solutions of fluid
momentum and energy equations. The wall temperature at the exit of the heat exchanger
is set as a reference temperature of system, which assumed to keep a constant value over
the system evaluation. Every other temperature value is deduced in terms of the reference
temperature in our calculations.
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From the system design perspective, the height of the thermal center height (LTC), flow
resistance factor, and the heat removal capacity of the heat exchanger (heat transfer area
and heat transfer coefficient) play crucial roles in determination of the mass flow rate in
the system ° .
The spatial temperature profile of PRHR
The fluid temperature in the core is assumed to increase linearly according to the height
of the core, at a constant temperature difference from the cladding temperature, as shown
in Figure 3-5. The heat generated in the fuel is transferred to the coolant in the reactor at a
rate according to the heat transfer coefficient, hcoRE. In order to evaluate operational
failure probability, we evaluate the reactor outlet temperature (PTH) at the hot channel
considering the enthalpy rise factor (FdeltaH). In the estimation of hCORE and the friction
factor of reactor core (fcoE), a modified Dittus Boelter correlation [Dittus et al, 1930]
and laminar flow analysis is used.
The fluid temperature in the heat exchanger decreases linearly according to the height of
the heat exchanger, keeping a constant temperature difference with the heat exchanger
wall temperature as shown in Figure 3-5. The heat is transferred from the heat exchanger
to the wall at a rate according to the heat transfer coefficient, hHx. The wall temperature
of the heat exchanger (TLWE) at the exit is one of the operational conditions. It is assumed
to keep a constant value over all operational conditions. In the heat exchanger, the heat
transfer coefficient (hHx) and friction factor (fax) are evaluated by measure of the Dittus
Boelter correlation and McAdams correlation, respectively.
10 In reality, two phase instability or flow oscillatory behavior may occur in the closed
loop. However, we do not take into account these phenomena in this work.
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Figure 3-5 Spatial temperature profile along the natural circulation loop
* Legend of Figure 3-5
System Geometry SPecification
The design specifications used in our research work refer to two reactor designs,
(AP1000 and AP600), and one research project (RP2). The decay power level of this
study is determined to be 55MWt, which is 20% higher than that of the AP1000. The heat
exchanger design in this study adopts some design parameters of the AP1000, but the
total area of one heat exchanger is 40% smaller than that of the AP 1000's heat exchanger.
In terms of core design, the particular data of passive designs are not available in the
literature. Therefore, our study makes use of a conventional PWR core design.
Although the attempt has been made to choose from the literature realistic design
parameters based on practical designs, the overall selection of design values is uncertain
to some extent (Note, the AP1000 enterprise did not respond to our request for needed
information). However, since this study focuses on the illustration of a methodology, it is
not necessary to fit the all design values to actual situation AP 1000 and AP600.
TýH
TLd
THWE: The exit wall temperature of reactor core
T11w: The wall temperature of reactor core
T11: The high side system temperature / Tsys: The average system temperature
TL: The low side system temperature / T1 w: The wall temperature of heat exchanger
TLWE: The exit wall temperature of heat exchanger
. ...... . ..........  .  .  ..
Table 3-2 Design parameters of reference PRHR with other types of PRHR design
referenced from AP1000 plant description [AP1000, 2000] and RMPS project
[RMPS, 2004]
Parameter This work AP 1000 AP600 RP2
Number of Power Loops 2 2 2 3
Number of PRHR Loops 2 1 1 3
Mass Flow Rate [kg/s](nominal) 73 68.04 45.36
Decay Power [MWt] (nominal) 55 4611 28.612 14
Failure Limit[oC] 343 - - 500
Nominal Pressure [MPa] 15 15.5 15.5 15.5
Number of Tubes 500 689 671 170
Area[m 2] 300 490 401
HX
Diameter[m] 0.0157 0.0157 N/A 0.0366
Tube Length[m] 12.12 14.43 N/A 2
Number of rods 55,777 45,373 41,327
Area[m 2] 8,400
CORE
Diameter[m] 0.012
Height[m] 4 4.26 3.65
Thermal Center Height[m] 10 - - 6.7
Loop diameter[m] 0.254 0.356 0.254
Design Value of FdeltaH 1.65 1.65
" The time when the PRHR operation is initiated
20001. 3400[MWt]*0.066*(44*60)- 0 2=46[MWt]
12 The time when the PRHR operation is initiated
2000]. 2040 [MWt]*0.066*(38*60)-O.2=28.6 [MWt]
for the AP1000 is 44 min [AP1000,
for the AP600 is 38 min [AP1000,
Governing equation and assumptions
The purpose of this model is only to illustrate the application of the methodology
developed above. In order to yield a simple practical example, the following assumptions
are made in developing the governing equations for this model:
1) Steady state flow
2) Single-phase flow
3) Fixed fluid pressure (15 MPa) and constant heat generation rate (55 MWt) operation
4) Uniform heat transfer within the heat exchanger and the reactor core.
Momentum Equation
Steady state flow is prevalent in a natural circulation loop when the driving force is
balanced by the retarding frictional force. Namely, the friction and form pressure losses
are equal to the buoyancy-generated pressure head1 3. The situation can be mathematically
expressed as:
H LiLt ih 2  2__[pgH,+ f fi, D2 .2 + Ki 2_2 ]= 0 (3.1)
D.2p1 4 2p4
where the index i refers to the different sections, p is the coolant density [kg/m3], H is the
height of section [min], f is the friction factor, L is the length of the section [min], D is the
hydraulic diameter of the section [min], h is the mass flow rate [kg/s], A is the flow area
of the pipe section [m2], and K is the form loss coefficient.
If we assume the Bossinesq approximation to be valid, then the density in the buoyancy
force term can be expressed as:
13 Since acceleration pressure changes cancel out over a closed loop, they are not
considered in the equation.
p= po[1- fi(T- To)], (3.2)
where po is a reference density corresponding to the reference temperature To. Using this
relationship in equation (3-1) and stating all section subscripts, the steady state equation
can be rewritten as:
LHx  h LCORE LmmLP
x DHx 2poA 2  CORE DcORE 2Po ACoR2  DLp 2Po ALP2
m 2(3-3)&n 2M2 &+ Kfl + KoF •-+Kp = flpo A Tg~rc
+ KHX 2 + KCORE 2 +K2 O2poAX 2poACORE   2p0 AL, 2
where the subscripts of HX, LP, and CORE denote the heat exchanger, circulation loop,
and reactor core, respectively. LTc and AT refer to the height of the thermal center and
the temperature difference of hot and cold sides, respectively.
Friction pressure drop
The friction factor can be expressed as a correlation of the form:
-= (3-4)Reb
where p and b depend on the nature of the flow. For example, values p of 64 and b of 1
indicate laminar flow, and assuming the McAdams correlation to be valid for turbulent
flow, p and b would be respectively equal to 0.184 and 0.20 (for the Blasius correlation, p
and b are 0.312 and 0.25)14.
In a non-uniform diameter flow section, it is possible that the flow types can be different
depending on the geometry of section. Even inside a single piping section, the different
flow types can be established due to the differences in thermal properties. For instance,
14 The McAdams correlation is valid in the range of 30,000<Re<10 6, and The Blasius
correlation is valid in the range of Re<30,000 for the smooth tube assumption.
the flow velocity of central and circumferential regions can be different in the sections of
the heat exchanger and the reactor core. However, these local phenomena' 5 are not
considered in our work. We assume that the flow pattern or velocity of each section is
represented by an average property. Such assumptions are not central to the validity of
our evaluation methodology.
From our preliminary calculation, the Reynolds number in the reactor core is about
2 x 103, which corresponds to the mixed flow regime. Hence, we applied a laminar flow
correlation for the estimation of the core friction factor. The Reynolds number of the heat
exchanger and circulation loop is about 105 and 2.7 x 106 respectively, which falls under
the turbulent regime. The McAdams correlations are valid to estimate the friction factors
of the heat exchanger and circulation loop.
These correlations are valid for the smooth tube assumption. For general commercial
steel, a value of 4.6E-5 is generally accepted as an absolute roughness [White, 1999]. The
revised friction factors in accordance with the relative roughness' 6 of each section and
their associated pressure drop are presented in Table 3-3. For instance, taking into
account the absolute roughness leads to an increase of friction pressure loss of 75% in the
heat exchanger and 67% in the circulation loop, as shown in Figure 3-6.
The adjustment of the friction factor in accordance with general roughness results in a
significant increase of friction and may give a substantial impact to the performance of
natural circulation.
a5 The local phenomena are discussed in the later section associated with qualitative
analysis of natural circulation.
16 A relative roughness is defined as an absolute roughness over a loop diameter.
Table 3-3 Friction factors and their associated pressure drops in the PRHR sections
Heat exchanger Circulation loop Reactor core17
Reynolds number 1.0E5 2.7E6 2.0E3
Flow type turbulent turbulent mixed
Friction factor 1.9E-2 9.4E-3 3.3E-2
Relative roughness 3.OE-3 1.7E-4
Friction pressure 75% 67%
drop increase
Revised friction factor 2.8E-2 1.4E-2
Frictional
dro 6.7 (kPa) 3.1 (kPa) 3 (Pa)pressure drop
The results of friction pressure drop in the heat exchanger, circulation loop, and reactor
core are 6.7 (kPa), 3.3 (kPa), and 3 (Pa), respectively. The friction factor in the core is
comparable to those of the heat exchanger and circulation loop. However, since the mass
flux in the core is much smaller than that of other sections (the flow area cross section of
the core is 14 times of that of the heat exchanger), the friction pressure drop in the core is
insignificant compared with that of other sections based on our preliminary calculation.
The friction pressure drop is proportional to the square of the mass flux. Therefore, the
magnitude of mass flux can be a major factor that determines the pressure drop. For the
case of natural circulation using steam generators, since the mass flux in the reactor core
is comparable to that of steam generators, the core pressure drop plays an important role
in the entire loop analysis.
17 The influence of the core in determining the friction pressure loss magnitude is
relatively small compared to those of heat exchanger and circulation loop. Thus, we do
not present the revised calculation of friction with the consideration of roughness.
DRe = pVD
Figure 3-6 Friction factor revisions taking into account generic roughness data of a
commercial steel ([Moody, 1944] and [White, 1999])
Form friction pressure drop
The form friction pressure drop is a localized and irreversible turbulent flow phenomenon
caused by change in flow geometry such as contraction and extraction. This serves a
dominant role in pressure drop in natural circulation systems as well as frictional pressure
drop as discussed in the previous section. Since the flow pattern in fittings and valves is
quite complex, the loss coefficients are commonly measured experimentally and
correlated with the pipe flow parameters.
The estimation of form loss with respect to these components is made for the purpose of
the analysis. First, the form loss data of heat exchanger and reactor core refer to a
multitubular system chart in the literature [Kays, 1984]. The data of valve and elbow
form losses refer to White data [1999] with the consideration of flow diameters.
f
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Figure 3-7 Schematic diagram of one PRHR loop used in considering form losses in
each node
Figure 3-7 illustrates the reference loop of PRHR, where form losses are evaluated at 10
nodes. In reality, the discharge line of the heat exchanger merges with the cold leg at
Node 5 and the inlet line of the heat exchanger diverges from the hot leg. At the places
where flow is merging and diverging, unexpected flow patterns can be established and
these may interfere with the natural circulation flow.
Generic data are used to obtain loss coefficients for each component. Particularly, since
the loss coefficient highly depends upon actual design and manufacturer's factor, use of
generic data may contribute large epistemic uncertainty in the analysis. Thus, the
literature [White, 1999] warns of a possible error of 50%, when generic data are utilized.
For greater accuracy, the particular design from a handbook [Lyons, 1982] or
manufacturer should be consulted.
Table 3-4 Form loss coefficient in each PRHR node
Node Form Loss Condition
Coefficient (K)
inlet 1.0 contraction
1 HX two elbows 0.15*2 1.8
outlet 0.5 extraction
2 Elbow 0.15
3 Air-OperatedValve 0.05 gate valve fully open(AOV)
4 Check Valve 2.0 swing check fully open
5 Elbow 0.15 merge with the cold leg
6 Elbow 0.15
inlet 1.0
7 CORE 1.5
outlet 0.5
8 Elbow 0.15 diverge from the hot leg
9 Motor-Operated Valve 0.05 gate valve fully open
(MOV)
10 Elbow 0.15
Circulation loop total 2.85
According to Table 3-4, the total system pressure loss coefficient is equal to 6.15. The
loss coefficients of the heat exchanger, the circulation loop, and reactor core are equal to
1.8 (29%), 2.85 (46%), and 1.5 (25%) respectively. The check valve has the largest loss
coefficient among the equipment. Hence, the partial opening of the check valve may play
a crucial role in the successful performance of the system.
System total pressure drop
The following results are presented in Table 3-5 for the calculation of pressure drop in
our system. Roughly 73% of pressure drop occurs from friction and 27% arises from
form loss in the system. The pressure drop in the heat exchanger and circulation loop is
comparable with the values of 54% and 46%, respectively. The pressure drop in the
reactor core is insignificant since its mass flux is much smaller than that of the heat
exchanger and circulation loop.
Table 3-5 Friction and form pressure drop in each section of the PRHR
The momentum equation balances the pressure losses around the loop so that friction and
form losses are compensated by the buoyancy term, while the energy equation balances
the heat source and heat sink.
Energy Balance Equation
At steady state, the heat generated in the core is transferred to the heat exchanger and the
heat delivered to the ultimate heat sink balance each other. The heat balance between the
temperatures of every node is represented below:
Q=hx(rh)A -( - =WE) pTH hCORE( A ORE THWE TH) (3-5)
PressurePressure HX Loop CORE total percent
Loss
Friction 6.7 (kPa) 3.1 (kPa) 3 (Pa) 9.8(kPa) 73%
Form 0.5 (kPa) 3.1 (kPa) 0.4 (Pa) 3.6(kPa) 27%
total 7.2 (kPa) 6.2 (kPa) 3.4 (Pa) 13.4(kPa) -
percent 54% 46% 0% - 100%
where Q is the heat transfer rate or decay power [MWt], Cp is the specific heat at
reference temperature. TLWE, TL, TH, and THWE denote the exit wall temperature of the
heat exchanger, the heat exchanger bulk temperature, the reactor core bulk temperature
and the exit wall temperature in the reactor core, respectively. hHX and hcoRE are the heat
transfer coefficients of the heat exchanger and core. A denotes the area of the heat
exchanging surfaces of each component.
This equation states that the enthalpy rise or fall in the heat exchanger and core is equal to
the heat exchange between the channel wall and the bulk of the coolant temperature.
Estimation of heat transfer coefficient (h)
Assuming that the flow is fully developed, for the estimation of the Nusselt number of the
circular tube, the Dittus_Boelter [Dittus et al, 1930] equations are the most universally
used correlations:
Nu = 0.023 Re" s Pr 0 .4 when the fluid is heated (3-6)
Nu = 0.023 Re' s Pr o3 when the fluid is cooled
For the estimation of the heat transfer coefficient of the heat exchanger (hHX), the
DittusBoelter correlation is used in the analysis.
For fully developed turbulent flow along rod bundles, Nu values may significantly
deviate from those of the circular geometry because of the non-uniform flow between the
subchannels. In order to take into account these effects, generally the modified
Dittus_Boelter correlation is used:
Nu = V x Nuc, , (3-7)
where Nuct is the Nusselt number of the circular tube case, and V is the correctional
factor for the rod bundles.
For the case of the square array with a ratio of rod pitch to diameter within 1.05 to 1.9,
Presser suggests the following equation for the correctional factor:
Vt =0.0217 + 0.1478(P/ D)- 0.1130e-7(P/D- ) (3-8)
For the estimation of the heat transfer coefficient of the reactor core (hcoRE), the modified
Dittus_Boelter correlation is used in the analysis.
Even though our analysis is limited to steady state, the above equations are not easy to
solve because the equations are nonlinear and non-analytical solutions cannot be found.
Generally, iterative methods are used in order to solve these equations. However, in our
case we solved the equations through response surface method which generate libraries
first and search solutions by mean of manipulation of the libraries. The detailed discuss
presented in Section 3.6.
3.4 Qualitative failure analysis of PRHR
Qualitative failure analysis is performed in order to select relevant parameters which may
most influence the performance of natural circulation. First, the various types of
phenomena which may arise in our passive design and contribute to specific failure
modes are discussed. Then, relevant parameters are determined by using analysis of
failure mode and cause. The uncertainties of determined parameters are quantified in the
following section.
3.4.1 Thermal hydraulic phenomena disturbing natural circulation
Five types of plausible thermal hydraulic phenomena that may disturb natural circulation
are presented: parallel channel effect, non-condensable gas, boron deposition, vortex
formation, and thermal stratification. The analyses of the parallel channel effect, non-
condensable gas, and thermal stratification have been performed extensively. These
phenomena are relatively well known potential interferences in the study of natural
circulation. On the other hand, more comprehensive study is needed for boron deposition
and vortex formation inside the loop. These two phenomena can give a substantial impact
to a particular natural circulation system such as PRHR in a PWR.
Parallel channel effect
With respect to natural circulation, interactions between multiple parallel flow paths may
become a critical phenomenon, mainly in terms of instability. The multiple parallel
channels that are connected to two plena and that have different heat fluxes may cause a
number of different flow configurations in which some channels may have flow in
opposite directions to others and some channels may even stagnate. Mackay et al. (2008)
found this problem in his study. Mackay et al. analyzed flow bypass phenomena in
parallel loop operation of the passive cooling system in the GFR. Another crucial
phenomenon corresponding to a parallel channel instability is the oscillation in one group
of channels 1800 out of phase with the oscillation in another group.
This phenomenon is of special concern because this instability may not be detectable by
monitoring total flow in the loop [Saha, 2004]. However, since our PRHR design
facilitates a C-shaped 18 heat exchanger that is used in AP1000 and AP600 [AP1000,
2000], the effects that occurred in the parallel channel are less influential in our system.
Effect of non-condensable gases
Non-condensable gases, if they are released into a closed loop, may accumulate at
specific locations depending on the configuration, and they can disturb coolant
circulation and degrade heat transfer in the heater and cooler. Within the primary loop of
our system, nitrogen transported from accumulators or hydrogen and oxygen created by
radiolysis inside of the reactor can be the sources of these non-condensable gases [Aksan,
1996]. Inappropriate treatment of air that dissolves in the coolant during an outage could
18 Here, C-shape means the shape of the heat exchanger seems to the character C. thus
it has only small portions of parallel channel parts.
be a plausible source of non-condensable gas once it starts operation.
For the case of our design, the upper plenum of the heat exchanger or the horizontal pipe
connected to the inlet of the heat exchanger are the most likely parts where the non-
condensable gases could accumulate. A certain amount of this accumulation may disturb
circulation flow, and inhibit the initiation of natural circulation. In addition, it may
interrupt proper heat transfer between the coolant and the heat exchanger.
In particular, the effect of non-condensable gases plays a crucial role in impairment of
two-phase natural circulation such as with the isolation condenser system in BWR.
Boron deposition and dilution
Boron concentration can take place at two stages: one is during normal operation period
and the other is the starting phase of the PRHR operation. During normal operation, the
PRHR coolant is stagnant and the temperature of the heat exchanger is low enough to
deposit boron. The part of PRHR near the hot leg is the most vulnerable place for boron
concentration. Specifically, deposited boron at the check valve causes a failure of the
opening or partial opening when the PRHR is required to work. In addition, a substantial
amount of boron may be concentrated on the surface of the heat exchanger broadly when
natural circulation is initiated since the initial temperature of the heat exchanger is cold
enough to deposit boron. Moreover, positive reactivity can be inserted to the reactor core
by the influx of the diluted coolant from the heat exchanger. Extensive discussions and
theoretical studies of these phenomena have been conducted concerning the emergence
core cooling system in Kiger et al. (2001) and Graffard et al. (2006).
Vortex formation in the primary loop and IRWST
The formation of a vortex can be established by interference of the main natural
circulation loop and unexpected local natural circulation inside of the hot leg. The
residual cooling capacity of the steam generator results in unexpected local natural
circulation. Because of the formation of a vortex, the successful initiation of natural
circulation can failed. Moreover, the established vortex may become a critical disturbance
factor to the flow of the main circulation loop even once natural circulation is initiated.
Figure 3-8 show an illustrative diagram of this phenomenon.
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Figure 3-8 Formation of local natural circulation loop and its disturbance to the
main loop
Another vortex can develop inside the IRWST when the IRWST provides a cooling
source for low pressure injection into the primary loop under large LOCA conditions.
Flow of water by gravity through small outlet pipes of this pool may lead to vortex
formation [Aksan et al, 1996]. The establishment of those vortexes, at the regions around
the outlet pipes, may produce a critical adverse effect on core cooling 19.
Thermal stratification
Thermal stratification denotes formation of horizontal layers of fluid of varying
temperature with the warmer layers of fluid lying above the cooler ones. Thermal
stratification can be encountered in a large pool of water like IRWST. Stratification
19 This phenomenon is less relevant to our system. However, it is noticeable that this
phenomenon can be a critical a failure mode in another passive safety function in passive
design.
reduces the rate of heat transfer to a great extent and the heat storage capacity of the pool
in the form of sensible heat is also significantly reduced [Saha, 2004].
When a heat source (heat exchanger) is placed vertically in a pool of water, the fluid
adjacent to the source becomes heated. In the process, the fluid density is lowered and by
virtue of the buoyancy force, the fluid in this region moves up. Once the heated water
reaches the top free surface, it turns and moves toward the wall of the pool along the
surface. Since the density of this heated water is relatively low, it does not flow
downward. If a vertical sink is provided, downward flow takes place in a narrow region
adjacent to the sink. Over a period of time, depending on the size and geometry of the
pool and the source, a greater part of the pool can become thermally stratified except for
the regions close to the heat source. In the region of the thermal stratification fluid is
almost static as shown in Figure 3-9.
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Figure 3-9 Thermal Stratification in the IRWST adapted from
The simulation of these complex phenomena is only partly or to a very limited degree
available for the time being. Extensive experiments and efforts to analyze these
phenomena need to be conducted concerning passive systems. In our work, we identify
these phenomena qualitatively and note them as potential causes of system failure.
3.4.2 Failure mode and cause analysis
The above discussion of thermal hydraulic phenomena corresponding to natural
circulation provides important insight to investigate failure modes, failure causes, and
their relevant parameters which can eventually contribute to the functional failure of a
system.
The FMEA method is employed in order to perform a qualitative analysis of PRHR. The
original FMEA method describes the inherent causes of events that can lead to a system
failure, determines their potential consequences, and investigates methods to mitigate
their occurrence or prevent recurrence. FMEA provides valuable qualitative knowledge
about system design and operation [Modarres et al, 1999].
In this study, we use parts of FMEA items and identify the parameters judged critical in
determining passive system performance allowing for the association between failure
modes and corresponding indicators of the failure cause.
The analysis of failure mode and cause starts from the identification of the functions of
the main components in a natural circulation (NC) system -- such as a heat source,
initiation of natural circulation, heat delivery, and heat sink functions. Each function
corresponds to those of the reactor core, valves, connection piping, heat exchanger and
IRWST, respectively. The potential failure modes which can impair or stop the natural
circulation and their causes are identified in terms of physical and phenomenological
failure causes. Consequently, the relevant parameters associated with the failure modes
are determined. The selected parameters are utilized in the analysis of uncertainty in next
section.
The results of the analysis are presented in Table 3-6. The heat source and sink have one
critical parameter that influences the performance of the passive system. Natural
circulation initiation and heat delivery function have one and four critical parameters,
respectively.
The phenomena that we discussed earlier are present as the causes of the failure modes.
However, our study is limited to steady state analysis, which makes it easy to
demonstrate the application of the methodology at a tractable level. Thus, some
phenomena are not properly taken into consideration such as flow oscillation or thermal
stratification phenomena, which require time-dependent analysis.
In our work we consider two kinds of epistemic uncertainties. The first is parameter
uncertainty which comes from measurement or estimation error, e.g. decay power,
reference temperature, pressure and form loss. The other is model uncertainty which
comes from the variability of a correlation model to predict a parameter, e.g. friction
factor and Nusselt number prediction. Seven variables are selected as shown in Table 3-6
through qualitative analysis and their uncertainties are discussed and quantified in the
following section.
Table 3-6 Qualitative analysis of passive residual heat removal system using failure
mode and cause analysis
Failure Mode
Low Coolant Inventory
High Initial Temp
Flow Block or
Friction increase
Friction increase
Flow disturbance
Envelop Failure
Envelop Failure
Flow disturbance
Heat Loss
Friction increase
Friction increase
Flow disturbance
High Heat Load
Local Fracture
Cause
Leak
Leak from heat exchanger,
Thermal Stratification
Valve Partial Open,
Inadvertent Valve closing
Fouling, Form loss
Aging/Oxidation,
Non Condensable gas
Material Defects,
Corrosion
Material Defects
Corrosion
Local Natural Circulation,
Boron deposition,
Non-Condensable gas,
Flow Oscillation
Insulator Aging
Fouling, Form loss
Fouling, Form loss
Aging/Oxidation
Improper Service Start,
Positive Reactivity
Insertion
Local Stress
Relevant
Parameter
Cooler
temperature
Check v/v
Form loss
Friction &
form loss
Heat transfer
Pressure
Pressure
Form loss
coefficient
Decay power
Friction &
form loss
Friction &
form loss
Heat transfer
Decay power
Function
Heat
Sink
Natural
Circulation
block
Heat
Transfer
(delivery)
Heat
Source
Component
IRWST
AOV
Check
Valve
Heat
Exchanger
Circulation
Loop
Reactor
Core
Fuel
3.5 Uncertainties quantification
The thermal hydraulic model used to find the steady-state solution uses a simplified
description of what happens in reality. The parameters and correlations used in the
thermal hydraulic model are subject to errors20 that arise in the processes of
measurement, estimation, or prediction. These errors can be modeled by means of a
probability distribution. Uncertainty21 is the representation of the dispersion of the error
using an appropriate probabilistic model. Equation 3-9 is one of ways to represent the
error or uncertainty.
y= f(x)e (3-9) 22
where y is the real value of the quantity, f(x) is the result of the correlation, measurement
or prediction, and e is the estimation error. This error can be modeled as an approximated
probability distribution with a corresponding confidence level.
The error represented in Equation 3-9 is associated with model or parameter uncertainty.
It is present because the values are estimated by correlation models or empirical data.
Both model and parameter uncertainties are epistemic uncertainties, and are meant to
describe our current state of knowledge through probability distributions.
The error ranges for each parameter or correlation are investigated from the relevant
20 Error is defined as the difference between an individual result and the true value of
the measurement [standard terms, 1993]. The true value can be regarded as a nominal
value in our study.
21 Uncertainty is a parameter associated with the result of a measurement, or estimation
that characterizes the dispersion of the values or error [standard terms, 1993]. However,
sometime, the meaning of error and uncertainty is interchangeable.
22 This representation of uncertainty is used in Pagani [2004).
literature. The normal distribution, whose mean value corresponds to the nominal value
and whose standard deviation is proportional to the estimation error, is used to represent
these epistemic uncertainties.
Estimation error for parameter values used in this work is:
* Decay power (Q): 20%
* Heat exchanger exit wall temperature (reference temperature, TLWE): 15%
* Form loss coefficient (K): 50%
* Form loss coefficient of check valve (IKheck) 23.
Estimation error for model uncertainties values used in this work is:
* Nusselt number (Nu): 30%
* Friction Factor (F): 30%.
The choices of values of these errors are demonstrated on below.
Decay power (heat source): Q
The nominal value of decay power (Q) in our design is 55 [MWt]. In order to quantify the
uncertainty of this decay power, we need to investigate the operating conditions of a
PRHR. According to AP600 and AP1000, the operation of a PRHR is incorporated into
the heat removal using the SG (in the secondary side) in case of an off-site power loss
event. The initial decay heat removal is performed by using the SG, and then when the
secondary coolant of the SG is depleted, the PRHR continues to the remove the decay
heat. The time when the PRHR operation is initiated for the AP600 and AP1000 are
38min and 44min, respectively [AP1000, 2000], and these times correspond to decay
power levels of 28 [MWt] and 46 [MWt], respectively. The initial coolant inventory of
the SG influences the estimation of the start-up decay power of PRHR (according to RP2,
the SG level has a 5% error range). In addition, the evaluation of thermal properties leads
to some ranges of error in treatment of decay power. Furthermore, positive reactivity
23 For check valve, the uncertainty treatment of the RMPS project is directly employed.
insertion, which may happen when suddenly diluted or cold coolant flows in the reactor,
gives rise to additional power generation. In general, taking into account all of the errors
that occur in the secondary coolant and inside the reactor, we assumed that decay power
error range is 20%24.
Heat exchanger exit temperature (heat sink): TLWE
This temperature is highly associated with the performance of containment heat removal
which arises between the IRWST and containment shell, as the result of two phase
natural circulation. As discussed in Section 3.4, thermal stratification or inventory loss
due to leaks or collection failure of returning water from the surface of the containment
may give rise to unexpected temperature increase of the IRWST. Considering all of these
uncertainties and the probabilistic model 25 used in RP2 system [RMPS, 2004], we
determined the estimation error of T_LWE to be 15%. We regard the exit point of the
heat exchanger as that of the reference temperature of our analysis. we assumed that this
temperature keeps a constant value over the system operation. The nominal value of the
reference temperature is set to 150 °C.
Friction Factor: F
During normal operation, the heat exchanger and circulation loop of the PRHR are filled
with stagnant reactor coolant at the temperatures between 30-50 C. Under these
circumstances, the surface of the components is vulnerable to fouling caused by the
depositions of crud, boron, corroded materials or microorganisms. These factors may
give rise to unexpected deterioration of the heat transfer rate and may increase the surface
friction of the components. These factors also influence the effective roughness of the
components. In accordance with the literature [White, 1999], roughness generally has
24 In RP2, the error range of decay heat is also assumed 20% by expert opinion.
25 In RP2, the water pool temperature is modeled as a truncated normal distribution with
a mean of 150'C and a standard deviation of 110C. This corresponds to the 15% error
with the confidence level 90%.
about a 30-60% estimation error for various kinds of piping materials. Considering these
uncertain conditions and general errors of roughness, we determined that the estimation
error of roughness is about 50%, which contributes to about a 15% increase in the friction
factor estimation. Table 3-7 shows absolute roughness and its corresponding estimation
error depending on materials.
Table 3-7 Roughness
1999]
values and estimation error for commercial ducts [White,
SAbsolute EstimationMaterial Condition
Roughness [mm] Error %)
Sheet metal 0.05 ± 60
Steel Stainless 0.002 ± 50
Commercial 0.046 ± 30
Cast 0.26 ± 50
Iron Wrought 0.046 ± 20
Galvanized 0.15 + 40
Additional sources of estimation error arise in the empirical correlations. The correlations
used to calculate the friction factor are obtained from experimental databases. These
correlations have a different functional form depending on the geometry, fluid
characteristics, boundary conditions (uniform heat or uniform temperature), and regime
(forced, natural or mixed convection), and they have a level of estimation error. At the
laminar flow regime, the estimation error of the friction factor is about 40%, and the
turbulent flow regime has about 15% of estimation error when using a Moody chart or
McAdams correlation [White, 1999].
Considering overall effects roughness error, fouling vulnerability, and correlation error,
we assigned the estimation error of the friction factor to 30%.
Form loss coefficient: K
The form loss pressure arises in the parts of components such as bends, valves, or
bottlenecks that rapidly expand and contract. Since the flow pattern in these area is quite
complex, the estimation theory is very weak. The losses are commonly measured
experimentally and correlated with the flow parameters. The data of the valves depends
on the particular manufacturer's design.
On the other hands, the data for elbow, inlet, and outlet spot values are obtained from the
empirical charts associated with their geometric parameters. Generally, an error value of
50% is accepted in the estimation of loss coefficient [White, 1999].
Form loss of check valve: Kcheck
Owing to the low driving force of passive systems, the partial opening of a check valve
can give rise to a great impact on the system performance. Unfortunately, for the time
being, there is no explicit analysis of the partial opening of a check valve.
In the RMPS (2004) project, an expert elicitation was performed for the estimation of the
partial opening probability of gate valves in accordance with opening fraction. The
empirical data of loss coefficient regarding the opening fraction of gate valves are present
in the literature [White, 1999]. We tentatively apply these data to the analysis of the
partial opening of a check valve.
Table 3-8 probability for partially opening check valve and its loss coefficients
Opening 1% 10% 50% 100%
Fraction
Probability 0.001 0.01 0.1 0.889
Losso inf 38 6 2Coefficient
The discrete estimation values of the loss coefficient shown in Table 3-8 are fitted with a
continuous function of Equation 3-10. In a similar manner, the discrete estimation values
of probability for the partial opening are fitted with a truncated normal distribution
26
with a mean of 123 and a standard deviation of 39.4.
The loss coefficient function according to the opening fraction of a check valve is
obtained as:
K = 2X- 6 (3-10)
where, K is the loss coefficient and X is opening area fraction of the check valve.
Figure 3-10 shows loss coefficient and probability density function corresponding to
partial opening fraction of a check valve.
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Figure 3-10 Loss coefficient and its probability density depending upon partial
opening of a check valve
26 This is truncated between 1 and 100.
Nusselt number: Nu
The Dittus-Boelter and modified Dittus-Boelter correlations are used to estimate the
Nusselt number of the heat exchanger and reactor core. As with the previous discussion
of friction factor, the degradation of the heat transfer rate is due in part to the fouling
effect in the heat exchanger. Considering this effect and error values from the literature27
we apply a 30% error on estimation of the Nu number.
Pressure: P
Pressure and temperature determine the value of thermal properties together. However, at
the high pressure of 15 MPa, which we assumed as an operating condition in this work,
the values of thermal properties are insensitive to variation of pressure except through
corresponding the value of the boiling temperature (Tboiling). Since we assume single
phase natural circulation, the effect of pressure variation is insignificant to the overall
performance of the system. However, the variation of pressure serves an important role in
failure criterion where we decide upon using the boiling temperature at the system
pressure as the maximum allowable value. Therefore, the uncertainty of pressure is
incorporated into the uncertainty of failure criterion and it is addressed in Section 3.7.
According to the literature [RMPS, 2004], The RP2 system considered an 8% error of
operating pressure and a 15% error is assumed in the GFR analysis by Pagani (2005). In
this work, we assume a 15% error band of pressure (the corresponding error of the
boiling temperature is 5%).
Representation of the errors with probability distributions
The normal distribution is used to model the errors. The errors determine the dispersion
of the normal distribution of which standard deviation is associated with confidence
levels. For a normal distribution, the two-sided 95% confidence interval lies at +1.96
27 The estimation errors refer to 30% and 15% with the cases of mixed convection and
free convection, respectively [Churchill, 1998].
standard deviations (C) from the mean value, therefore an error of +2% of the mean
corresponds roughly to a standard deviation of 1% of the mean. In the same manner, for
the case of 90% confidence, the confidence interval lies at +1.64 cy, with an error of ±2%
of the mean corresponding to a standard deviation of 1.2% of the mean, and for the case
of 80% confidence, the confidence interval lies at ±1.28 (, with an error of ±2% of the
mean corresponding to a standard deviation of 1.56% of the mean.
The confidence level for the estimation error also represents the level of uncertainty. A
high confidence level means a decision maker agrees with the error range very strongly.
Thus, the standard deviation corresponding to the error band is small. On the other hand,
a low confidence level probability model indicates that a decision maker agree with the
error range rather weakly so the corresponding standard deviation is large. In our work,
we use a 90% confidence interval.
Figure 3-11 shows the representation of the probability distributions for an error range
with three cases of confidence level 95%, 90% and 80%. Table 3-9 presents uncertain
parameters, their corresponding error ranges and distributions.
s: standard deviation
- error
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mean + error
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Figure 3-11 Error representation depending on confidence interval
Table 3-9 Representation of errors with normal distribution corresponding to
confidence interval
Normal distribution
Uncertain Symbol Nominal Error for confidence interval
Parameter value Er 95% 90% 80%
1 Decay Q 55MWt 20% N(1,0.100) N(1,0.120) N (1,0.152)Power
Friction Table
2 Factor F T 30% N(1,0.150) N(1,0.180) N (1,0.228)
Coefficient
Form Loss Table3 orLoss K Table 50% N(1,0.250) N(1,0.300) N (1,0.380)
Coefficient 3-4
Reference4 Reference T_LWE 150 0 C 15% N(1,0.075) N(1,0.090) N (1,0.114)
Temperature
5 Nusselt Nu 217 30% N(1,0.150) N(1,0.180) N (1,0.228)
Number (HX)
P 15MPa 15% N(1,0.075) N(1,0.090) N(1,0.114)
6 Pressure
BP 3430C 5% N(1,0.025) N(1,0.030) N(1,0.038)
Check valve
Form Loss
7 Coefficient Kcheck 2.0 direct N(123,34.0) N(123,34.0) N(123,34.0)
(Partial
Opening)
3.6 Computer Simulation Model and its Programming
3.6.1 Stochastic Response Surface Method
The response Surface Method (RSM) explores the relationships between several
explanatory variables and one or more response variables. The RSM is useful for
modeling and analysis in applications where a response of interest is influenced by
several variables and the objective is to optimize this response. In that sense it is a
variation upon the general method of using response surface for finding a solution to a set
of simultaneous equations.
By using an approximate model (response surface), RSM can find optimal points
(maximum or minimum) and can increase calculation efficiency substantially. However,
if the amount of fitting data is insufficient and the region of interest is not specified, the
results of RSM can be too inaccurate for the originally intended purposes.
The Stochastic Response Surface Method (SRSM) [Isukapalli et al, 1998] is one of the
applied methods of RSM. SRSM uses response surfaces to measure the stochastic
response of inputs which are expressed in terms of a set of randomly selected variables
from the designated probability density function.
In this study, the concepts of RSM and SRSM are used to build a computational code.
Likewise original SRSM, we generate response surfaces (libraries) according to two
specified coordinate variables and utilized them to find a distribution of output. The
response surfaces are created by thermal hydraulic equation calculations. However, such
computational implementation does not coincide exactly with original SRSM.
3.6.2 Implementation of Stochastic Response Surface Method (SRSM)
The purpose of the analysis is to obtain an output distribution for a particular parameter 28
using input distributions that consist of the uncertain parameters discussed in Section 0.
In order to obtain the output distribution, we start our programming with the assignment
of coordinate variables and their domains.
Careful examination of the momentum and energy equation shows that the sources of
nonlinearity come from the mass flow rate and thermal properties. Moreover, at high
28 Here, the exit temperature of hot channel is the observed parameter.
pressure, the temperature is main determinant of the thermal properties. Consequently, if
we assume that the values of the mass flow rate and system temperature are known, the
equations could be made linear and thus very efficient to calculate. In this way, we set X
and Y coordinates to represent the mass flow rate and system temperature, which are the
main source of nonlinearity in the equation. The domain of these coordinate values is
determined with particular bands considering nominal values of mass flow rate and
system temperature29 and maximum precision of failure probability30.
Then, multiple response surfaces are generated in accordance with the X and Y
coordinate values (mass flow rate and system temperature). The multiple response
surfaces represent libraries of all temperature nodes, decay power, and heat transfer
coefficients.
The next step is the process of searching for solution cells (i.e., pixels in the independent
variable grid simultaneously satisfying the heat and momentum equations). A solution is
defined as a mean value of the solution cells. The determination of a solution requires a
set of input values and two operating conditions.
The input values have their own probability distributions which are defined in Section 0.
A set of input values is randomly selected for every calculation. The selected set of input
values rearranges the values of the multiple response surfaces 31.
The two operating conditions in our study are the decay power and reference temperature,
whose values are determined to be constants throughout the calculation 32. The constant
29 The nominal values of mass flow rate and system temperature are 73 kg/s and 203 1C.
30 We determined the maximum precision of failure probability in this study is 10- 5.
31 Linear transformation of the multiple response surfaces takes place because each
uncertain value is multiplied to libraries arithmetically based on equation (3-9).
32 A constant value is represented an equal value line on a response surface.
values of the operating conditions create equal value lines of the response surface of the
operating conditions. The selected set of input values rearranges the response surfaces of
either operating condition, which redefines the two equal value lines. The cross-section
cells of these two equal value lines determine a new solution by taking the average.
Through repetitive execution of the searching process, an output distribution can be
established. The governing principles of this programming method are presented in detail
in Appendix A. Figure 3-13 shows a graphical illustration of the searching procedure.
Response
Surface Set
(RSS)
Input variables RSS Manipulation Output
(random selection) Searching Solution Cells Distribution
Operating Conditions
Figure 3-12 Schematic Flow diagram of Stochastic Response Surface Method
The SRSM is a method that linearizes non-linear governing equations, and it obtains
solutions efficiently. One its biggest advantages is that it does not need to calculate a new
solution for different operating conditions or input values from start to finish. Whenever
those operating conditions or input values are changed, the solution can be easily
€ \
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obtained by using a linear transformation and manipulation of a Response Surface Set
(RSS). Another advantage of the method is a relatively simple and easy coding procedure.
Therefore, SRSM could be better in terms of calculation efficiency when performing
large numbers of simulations.
SRSM has five main components: input value, output value, response surface set (RSS),
operating conditions, and searching process. Figure 3-12 shows a procedure that
represents how the natural circulation system can be modeled and how response surfaces
can be constructed for a reference case calculation. Detailed descriptions of the various
parts of the flow diagram in Figure 3-12 are presented as follows.
3.6.3 Coordinate Variable Selection
This work specifies coordinate variables for RSS generation as the mass flow rate and
system temperature. Based upon the thermal hydraulic model, the non-linearity of the
momentum and energy equations is mainly caused by these two variables. The mass flow
rate has non-linear features in the calculation of friction and form loss pressure drop. The
other nonlinear features are attributed to the calculation of thermal properties as affected
by the system temperature. Therefore, by assigning these two variables to matrix
coordinate variables and generating response surfaces according to the coordinate
variables, we can avoid numerical iteration for non-linear equations.
3.6.4 System Properties
Three kinds of properties are used to generate RSS: geometry, thermal hydraulics and hot
channel factors. The detailed geometrical properties are presented in Table 3-2. Five
thermal hydraulic properties are referenced from Steam Tables and are incorporated into
RSS generation. The enthalpy rise and hot channel factor refers to the AP1000 design
data [AP1000, 2000]. Since the geometric data and hot channel factors are associated
with the system equation through the arithmetic multiplication, the change of these values
after the RSS generation can still be handled in the searching process. On the other hand,
a change in the thermal properties is not able to be incorporated into the search when the
RSS has been established because the properties are incorporated into the system
equation with specific functions referenced from the Steam Tables. The various kinds of
properties incorporated into the RSS generation are listed in Table 3-10.
Table 3-10 Property data that are used in the RSS generation
Geometry Thermal Hydraulics Hot channel Factor
Property Symbol3 3  Property Function34  Factor Symbol
Channel D Specific Cf Enthalpy F deltaH
Diameter Heat Rise
Channel Expansion Hot
Cross section Darea Coefficient Channel F
Number of N Conductivity KfChannel
Thermal Center Thermal Center LTC Viscosity mufHeight
Channel Length L Density Lof
3.6.5 Solution check and adjustment of coordinate domain and mesh, and band width
of operational condition
When the trial RSS is generated, a heat balance check procedure for each temperature
node should be performed in order to avoid potential calculation errors. One reason for
the errors may be the fact that the coordinate domain (CD) is not large enough to include
all solution cells. The other reason is that the mesh size of the coordinate variables (CM)
is not fine enough, which captures inappropriate cells in the solution set and creates an
error when taking the mean of all solution cells. The band size of the operational
conditions (BOCs) also influences the error of the result. If the band is too narrow, then
33 These are symbols used in the SRSM computer code
34 These are function names used in SRSM computer code
there might be no corresponding solution cell. If the band is too broad, then the
estimation error could be large. These three kinds error are reducible errors with the
adjustment of CD, CM and BOC. In this work, the precision of estimation of a
probability range is on the order of 10-5, so the probability accuracy is evaluated at the
order of precision of 10- .
3.6.6 Searching process and Operational conditions
The RSS includes all the libraries of the system parameters: temperatures, friction factors,
heat transfer coefficients, and decay power as shown in Figure 3-13. Since the RSS
consists of two dimensional response surfaces, at least two conditions are required in
order to specify a solution. As we assumed earlier in Section 3.3, the decay power (Q)
and heat exchanger exit temperature (TLWE) keep constant values throughout the system
operation.
These two parameters and their corresponding matrices are the operational conditions.
When values of the decay power and heat exchanger exit temperature are assigned, their
equal-value lines can be drawn as shown in Figure 3-13. Through the projection of one
curve to the other, the cross sectional cells35 are determined. By taking the average of
these solution cells, a solution value is defined in this simulation.
35 These are called solution cells.
Operational
X coordinate (mass flow rate)
Figure 3-13 Response Surface Set and Operational Condition Response Surfaces
Since all other response surfaces are based on the same coordinates (the X and Y), the
solution cells of each response surface are determined at the same coordinate locations.
Another input value set determines different solution cells by redrawing equal-value lines,
which then define a new solution value as well. However, since this process is a linear
transformation of the response surface, the calculation speed and efficiency are very high.
The detailed principles associated with this process and the formulation of the operational
conditions are discussed in Appendix A.
3.6.7 Input and Output Data
Input data matrices are composed of randomly selected variables from the probability
distribution of uncertain parameters. Monte Carlo, a direct sampling method is commonly
used. In order to improve the sampling efficiency, special sampling methods such as
Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) can be introduced.
Response
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The input values of SRSM are selected from the corresponding probability density
functions (PDFs), which reflect the epistemic uncertainty of the parameters. The selected
input values rearrange the value of response surfaces and change the area of the solution
cells. An output is presented by taking the average of the solution cells. The output data
can be elicited depending on the number of samples and can make a distribution.
Figure 3-14 plots a histogram of the outlet temperature in the hot channel for a two loop
design. The histogram is the result of 10,000 simulations. For each individual simulation
random values for the uncertain parameters and for the correlation errors were selected
from the relative distributions as defined in Section 3.5. The figure shows the large
uncertainty of the result around its nominal value of 301TC.
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Figure 3-14 Temperature distribution in the hot channel exit for
design at the 90% confidence level
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3.7 Failure Criterion
The failure criterion used in this work is that of coolant boiling. This is used because of
its simplicity. More realistic criteria would be used; however, such accuracy is not
necessary here, where our work is performed for purposes of the illustration of ideas.
The boiling temperature of the hot channel exit under the operating pressure is the failure
criterion (3430 C for 15Mpa). When the hot channel exit temperature reaches the failure
limit, we judge that the PRHR does not satisfy its original purpose of performing single
phase natural circulation heat removal. This limit is arbitrary and is not suggested as a
realistic criterion 36
In thermal hydraulics, the commonly used failure criteria are oxidation reaction
acceleration, excessive cladding temperature, or excessive temperature or thermal stress
of the structure. However, under our assumption that there is no LOCA or transient but
the reactor is scrammed and reactor core is still submerged in coolant, achieving such a
high temperature is still considerably difficult.
Another proposed failure criterion is associated with opening of the Safety Relief Valve
(SRV) of the pressurizer. Insufficient heat removal of the PRHR causes to an increase in
the system pressure and opens the SRV when it reaches the set point pressure. The
primary coolant inventory starts to decrease due to flow through the opening and finally
the transient continues towards a core melt-down state under high pressure. The SRV set
point is 17 MPa and its corresponding boiling temperature is 352 C. If the system is
analyzed with respect to pressure, this criterion can be one of a good predictor of failure
criteria.
As discussed in Section 3.5, we assign a 15% error to system pressure prediction and its
36 A boiling temperature is used in a failure criterion of evaluating a cooling performance
of spent fuel pool.
corresponding boiling temperature error is 5%. The failure limit has a distribution whose
mean value corresponds to the nominal value (343 1C) and whose standard deviation is
proportional to the estimation error.
Finally, functional failure is defined by interference between the distribution of hot
channel temperature which is calculated by the SRSM process and the distribution of
boiling temperature at 15MPa.
3.8 Results (90% confidence level)
Among the three levels of confidence considered, we decided to set 90% confidence as a
reference case and to obtain the functional failure probability of active and passive
systems as functions of the number of coolant loops used. As discussed in Section 3.2.1,
our reference design of a passive cooling system consists of two identical loops 37
operating in parallel.
Table 3-11 Probabilities of functional failure for different parallel loop
configurations
The values obtained in Table 3-11 are conditional probabilities based upon the natural
circulation having already been established, and transient events are not being taken into
account. The functional failure probability result of one loop in the passive design is
about 0.72, which is too large for practical use. As mentioned in Section 3.2.1, our
37 The functional failure probability of one loop passive system is about 0.7, so this
design is not appropriate as a reference design.
System type 1 loop 2 loops 3 loops
PassivePassive 7.23E-01 3.54E-02 9.20E-3
design
ActiveActive 6.67E-03 3.20E-04 <1.0E-5
design
reference passive design is a two loop configuration. The result of the reference passive
design functional failure probability is 0.0354, which is comparable to usual system
hardware failure. A detailed analysis of hardware failure will be discussed in Chapter 4.
Note that a single passive coolant loop likely has a lower expected cooling capacity than
that of an industrial design such as the AP1000 (in the absence of sufficient design data a
definitive state cannot be made).
Through the cooperative configuration 38, the functional failure probability is reduced
significantly in the 2-loop and 3-loop passive designs. On the other hand, all active
designs have relatively low values of functional failure probability in comparison with
those of passive designs. One reason is that the active design has a high mass flow rate
compared with that of passive design, which contributes to increase of performance
margin in functional analysis in the system.
Importance measurement of uncertain parameter in functional failure
The general importance measure concept in PRA can be introduced to the measurement
of importance of an uncertain parameter. The Uncertainty Reduction Worth (URW) and
Uncertainty Fussell-Vesely (UFV) [Fussell, 1975] can be defined as shown below.
Uncertainty Reduction Worth (URW):
URW is a measure of the change in functional failure when an uncertainty of a parameter
is set to zero. URW for a parameter is determined by assuming that the parameter does
not contribute to the functional failure of the system. The importance measured how
much better the system can become as its parameters are improved.
38 Cooperative configuration means that all loops are required to work together in order
to satisfy their mission, for instance, 2-out-of-2 or 3-out-of-3 configuration. On the
other hand, redundant configuration means that single loop operation is sufficient to
satisfy the system mission, the other loops are on stand-by for the case of failure of the
single loop, for instance, 1-out-of-2 or 1-out-of-3 configuration.
FoUH=F# (3-11)
where FP= current functional failure, Ff = functional failure when parameter i has not an
uncertainty.
Uncertainty Fussell-Vesely (UFV):
UFV is a measure of the contribution of parameter i to the total functional failure of the
system.
UFV = FO-
where 1- = current functional failure, F = functional failure when parameter i has not an
uncertainty.
In practice, this measure can be used to identify uncertain elements of a system that are
the best candidates for efforts leading to improving system reliability.
In accordance with the above definition, we applied these importance measurements to
the functional failure of the 2-loop passive design. The measurement values with respect
to uncertain parameters are presented in Table 3-12.
Table 3-12 Importance measurement of uncertain parameters
(passive two loops, 90% confidence interval)
in functional failure
Fo Q F K TLWE Nu P Kcheck
F- 0.0354 0.0241 0.0301 0.0316 0.0267 0.0334 0.0242 0.0072
URW - 1.4689 1.1761 1.1203 1.3258 1.0599 1.4628 4.9167
UFV - 0.3192 0.1497 0.1073 0.2458 0.0565 0.3164 0.7966
Rank - 2 5 6 4 7 3 1
Impact Medium Low Low Medium Low Medium High
(3-12)
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Figure 3-15 Importance measurement of uncertain parameters
Based upon the results of UFV, we can classify the uncertain parameters into three
categories. Partial opening of the check valve is involved in the high value uncertainty
importance category. Pressure, decay power, and the reference temperature are
categorized in the medium uncertainty level. The low uncertainty group includes the
uncertainty of friction factor, form loss coefficient, and Nusselt number, which associated
with heat transfer coefficient. The result demonstrates that the uncertainty of the check
valve, decay power and pressure play major roles in system functional failure. We
investigate the variation of the functional failure according to the variation of these two
uncertainties through sensitivity analysis in the following section.
Sensitivity analysis for critical uncertain parameters
The sensitivity analysis is performed on the two critical uncertain parameters. According
to the result of importance measurement, form loss of the check valve (partial opening of
the check valve), decay power, and pressure are selected and three case sensitivities are
preformed for these parameters. The variation of functional failures depending on the
cases is present in Table 3-13.
- -~~~~~~~~~--~-~~-~~~--- ---- ~-~~ ~-~ ~~~--- ~~----~-~ -~
Table 3-13 Sensitivity analysis of critical uncertain parameters
0.56o C 1.5u
Parameter 50% decreased 50% increased
uncertainty oginal uncertainty
Check valve 0.0095 0.0354 0.0843
form loss (Kcheck) (26%) (100%) (238%)
0.0285 0.0354 0.0547
Decay power (80%) (100%) (154%)
0.0321 0.0354 0.0387
Pressure (P) (91%) (100%) (109%)
If we can reduce by half the epistemic uncertainty of the check valve, decay power, and
pressure, the functional failure probability can be decreased to 26%, 80%, and 90% of the
original value, respectively. Although the uncertainty importance of decay power and
pressure is comparable, uncertainty of the decay power is more sensitive for the
functional failure probability than that of pressure.
Sensitivity Analysis of K..check, Q, and P
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Figure 3-16 Sensitivity analysis of form loss of check valve, decay power and
pressure
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Sensitivity analysis for critical geometry parameters
The heat exchanger area (HXA), thermal center height (TC) and loop pipe diameter
(DLP) are identified as the best parameters that can be used to improve the heat removal
capacity of a system. Sensitivity analysis is performed by evaluating functional failure
probability depending upon the increase rate (20%-100%) of the geometric parameters.
1. Heat Exchanger Area increase (HXA): 20%-100%
2. Thermal Center height increase (TC): 20%-l100%
3. D LP: 20%-100%
Table 3-14 Sensitivity analysis of critical geometry parameters, 2 Loop PRHR
Functional Failure with Critical Parameters
0 20 40 60
Parameter Increase(%)
Figure 3-17 Functional failure variation according to the increase of geometry
parameters, 2 Loop PRHR
Increased percentage 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
HXA 0.0354 0.0280 0.0246 0.0211 0.0190 0.0172
Functional
Failure TC 0.0354 0.0252 0.0173 0.0106 0.0088 0.0066
Probability
DLP 0.0354 0.0153 0.0045 0.0028 0.0012 0.0009
0.04
0.035
0.03
0.025
0.02
0.015
0.01
0.005
0
-E- HXA
--- TC
0-D-_LP
80 100
Figure 3-17 demonstrates that the functional failure probability can be reduced by 50%
and 80% through the respective increases of the heat exchanger area and thermal center
height. Moreover, the increase of the pipe diameter reduces the functional failure almost
by 95%. Thus, the third method is the most efficient method compared to the others.
However, additional factors should be taken into account in order to obtain more explicit
results. First form loss change related to the increased diameter of the heat exchanger
should be considered. Second, the friction factor can be increased depending on the
extension of piping length in the case of TC increase. Third, the increase of the loop pipe
diameter influences the check valve size and its corresponding uncertainty. Moreover, the
form loss coefficient should also be revised depending on the pipe size.
Importance measurement and sensitivity analysis provide information about critical
parameters and their effects upon functional failure probability. When the system requires
improvement and the resources are limited, the information can help the project manager
in making a decision about resource allocation.
Capacity Enhancement (50% thermal center height increase + 60% heat exchanger area
increase)
Table 3-11 shows the failure probability of the one loop passive design to be too high for
practical purposes. As shown in a sensitivity analysis, the heat removal capacity of the
passive systems can be enhanced by increasing the thermal center height and the heat
exchanger area. Table 3-15 shows the result of the systems whose capacity is enhanced
by increasing the thermal center height (50%) and the heat exchanger area (60%).
Table 3-15 Probability of Functional Failure
passive systems
for Capacity Enhancement of the
System 1 loop 2 loops 3 loops
TC 50%
Increase 1.22E-01 1.32E-02 7.20E-04
*(1.19Q)
Passive HXA 60%
Design Increase 3.52E-01 2.11E-02 2.38E-03
*(1.08Q)
No change 7.23E-01 3.54E-02 9.20E-03
Active 6.67E-03 3.20E-04 <1.OE-05
Design
* Heat removal rate of one loop systems when those hot channel exit
temperature reach the boiling temperature (Q=55MWt).
Table 3-15 shows that the capacity of the passive system can be increased, but still not
sufficiently to that of the active design (one-loop system). In order to obtain the same
capacity level as the active system, the passive system requires a higher thermal center or
larger heat exchanger. However, the thermal center height and the size of heat exchanger
are restricted by the containment height or the size of IRWST. A larger containment and
IRWST design might have large economic implications for the passive system plants.
3.9 Summary
This chapter explores a methodology for the evaluation of functional failure. In order to
demonstrate the methodology, a passive residual heat removal system is used. The
methodology consists of four main procedures: system modeling, uncertain parameter
selection, uncertainty quantification, and computer simulation.
System modeling is performed by investigating physical system and its relevant thermal
hydraulic equations. In order to make the problem easier to solve, a simplified steady-
state model is used. The attempt to use feasible design parameters has been made based
on practical reactor designs (AP1000, AP600, and conventional PWR)
Uncertain parameters are investigated by measures of qualitative failure analysis. First,
feasible phenomena in natural circulation are present and discussed. Then failure mode
and cause analysis is performed for our specific passive design. Consequently, seven
design parameters are selected and utilized in the uncertainty quantification procedure.
Quantification of uncertainty for the selected parameters uses two procedures. First, the
parameter or modeling errors are investigated from expert opinions or using the literature.
Then, these errors are represented as a normal distribution whose mean value corresponds
to the nominal value and whose standard deviation is proportional to the estimation error.
The stochastic response surface method (SRSM) is adapted to create a computer
simulation code. Monte Carlo (MC) simulation with a variance reduction technique
(Latin hypercube sampling) is performed to sample uncertain parameters from specified
probability distributions.
Functional failure probability for passive and active designs considering multiple-loop
systems are evaluated using the presented methodology. The results show that functional
failure is an important risk element in passive systems. On the other hand, in active
systems, functional failure is relatively less influential.
Importance indicators of uncertain parameters are defined and evaluated. Regarding the
reference passive design, form loss of the check valve is identified as the most important
factor. Then, decay power and pressure have a high importance in functional failure. A
sensitivity analysis is performed regarding to these three high importance parameters and
critical geometry parameters.
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Chapter 4 Comprehensive comparison of active and passive design
including functional failure, hardware failure, and human error
Table 3-11 in Chapter 3 presents the results of functional failure probability in active and
passive design depending upon multiple loop configurations. The effect of functional
failure upon the passive system is much larger that that of the active system. However, in
order to compare these two designs at the system reliability level, a comprehensive
evaluation method is required that includes hardware failure, human error and common
cause failure of the systems.
Hardware failure is analyzed by means of conventional fault tree analysis with
component reliability data obtained from the database of AP1000 PRA and EPRI. The
probabilities of basic events of component failures are modeled by means of the
lognormal distribution. Thus, sensitivity analysis is performed based upon lognormal
assumptions.
The Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) method is used to evaluate
human error probabilities. A brief introduction of the THERP method and its procedure
are presented in Section 4.3. Two different sorts of human errors are dealt with this study.
The first is pre-accident human error and the second is post-accident human error. We
performed two illustrative analyses of the effects of pre-accident human error and
incorporated the results of this analysis into the comparison of the two systems. The value
of post-accident human error probability is adopted from the AP1000 analysis. Sensitivity
analysis is performed based upon lognormal assumption in the same manner as with
hardware failures.
Common cause failure is considered in reliability evaluation of the effects of system
redundancy. The Multiple Greek Letter (MGL) model [Fleming et al, 1986] is used for
the multiple loop analysis. A brief introduction of MGL and its corresponding equations
according to loop configurations are presented in Section 4.4. Data of MGL parameters
refer to AP 1000 PRA and studies done by Idaho national laboratory [Marshall, 1995].
4.1 Definition of loop configurations in active and passive systems
The configuration of active and passive loops must be defined before actual analysis or
comparison. Simply speaking, the evaluation and comparison have been performed based
on the number of system loops required. In active designs, the number of the loops is
determined mainly by the number of pumps used in the system as shown in Figure 4-1.
The two motor-operated valves are installed parallel at system inlet, the heat exchanger
inlet, and system outlet, respectively. The basic loop has only one heat exchanger while
the two and three loop configurations have two heat exchangers. We defined the
reference loop of the active design as the two loop configuration.
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Figure 4-1 Configurations of active one, two, and three loop systems
Since our study considered the case of loss of offsite power accident, it is necessary to
operate emergency diesel generators (EDGs) when the active system needs to perform its
task. We assumed that two identical EDGs are installed in parallel and are connected with
the active system supplying electrical power.
In the passive design, the two and three loop configuration consist of parallel installed
two and three identical basic loops, respectively as shown in Figure 4-2. The basic loop is
composed of one heat exchanger, two air-operated valves which are installed parallel, one
check valve and one motor-operated valve, which is open in normal operation. We
defined the reference loop of the passive design as the two loop configuration.
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Figure 4-2 Configurations of passive one, two, and three loop systems
Two configuration modes are introduced in this study: 1) redundant configuration such as
1-out-of-k configuration, and 2) cooperative configuration such as k-out-of-k. The
redundant configuration uses a multiplication of critical components or loop of a system
with the intention of increasing hardware reliability while functional failure does not
change because there are no changes in fluid driving force and thus no change in heat
removal capacity. In the cooperative configuration, every component or loop shares the
system load partly, and thus the system can increase the capacity for tolerating the load.
The cooperative configuration is used for the purpose of reducing functional failure
probability in this study. Note that hardware failure probability can be increased in
cooperative mode as the number of loops increases because cooperative mode requires all
the components or loops to work simultaneously.
4.2 Hardware Reliability
Hardware failure of the active system is evaluated based upon several assumptions. First,
we assumed that the cooling source (IRWST) maintains a temperature of 150 C over the
system operation, and that there is no failure in the IRWST. Second, we assumed that two
stand-by EDGs are installed and provide power to the active residual heat removal system
(ARHR) in the event of offsite power loss. Major failure modes of components are
considered and the reliability data of those components (Table 4-1 and Table 4-2) refer to
NRC generic data [NUREG/CR-4550] and Westinghouse AP1000 PRA report
[AP1000PRA, 2002].
Common cause failures are taken into account based upon generic parameters, which are
presented in Table 4-9. Table 4-3 and Table 4-4 present the results of our analysis of
performance of the cooperative and redundant configurations.
Table 4-1 Reliability data of
EPRI generic data)
hardware for active design (from AP1000 PRA and
Component Failure mode Probability
Fail to start 1.40E-02
EDG Fail to run 5.00E-02
(Emergency Diesel
Generator) T&M unavailability 6.00E-03
Human Error (pre) 3.30E-03
Heat exchanger Envelop fail 2.40E-05
Check valve Fail to open 1.75E-03
Table 4-2 Reliability data of hardware for passive design (from AP1000 PRA)
Component Failure mode Probability
Fail to open 1.09E-03
AOV T&M unavailability 5.00E-04
Human Error(pre) - 3.30E-03
Heat exchanger Envelop fail 2.40E-06
Check valve Fail to open 1.75E-03
The hardware failures of the active and passive design for one loop are evaluated to be
1.63E-02 and 1.88E-03, respectively. The major contributors of the hardware failures are
EDGs and pump in the active system, and AOV in the passive system.
4.2.1 Uncertainty of hardware failure probability
Uncertainty of hardware failure probability has been modeled with lognormal distribution
truncated in the interval of [0, 1]. It has been known that lognormal is an appropriate
distribution for representing failure rates for components whose early failures dominate
their overall failure behaviors. Based upon the generic failure data [NUREG/CR-4550],
the lognormal error factor of pumps is 10 and that of AOVs is 3. Considering other
equipment error factors, we assigned values of 5 and 3 to the error factor of active and
passive designs, respectively.
Table 4-3 shows the hardware failure probability of the median, 5 th and 9 5 th percentile
values of active and passive designs for redundant configurations. As discussed in section
4.1, the redundant configuration has an advantage for reducing hardware failure
probability. Table 4-4 shows the hardware failure probability of the median, 5th and 9 5 th
percentile values of active and passive designs for cooperative configurations.
Cooperative configurations are effective in reducing functional failure probability, with
an increased likelihood of hardware failure.
Table 4-3 Uncertainty of hardware failure probability (Redundant configuration)
Hardware failure probability
Design RedundantthDesign Configuration Mean Median 5th 95th
percentile percentile
1 out of 1 1.63E-02 1.49E-02 2.98E-03 7.45E-02
Active 1 out of 2 9.09E-03 8.31E-03 1.66E-03 4.15E-02
1 out of 3 8.46E-03 7.73E-03 1.55E-03 3.86E-02
1 out of 1 1.88E-03 1.80E-03 6.01E-04 5.41E-03
Passive 1 out of 2 1.53E-04 1.47E-04 4.89E-05 4.40E-04
1 out of 3 1.36E-04 1.31E-04 4.36E-05 3.92E-04
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Table 4-4 Uncertainty of hardware failure probability (Cooperative configuration)
Hardware failure probability
D Cooperative 5 th 9 5 thDesign Configuration Mean Median5th 95th
percentile percentile
1 out of 1 1.63E-02 1.49E-02 2.98E-03 7.45E-02
Active 2 out of 2 3.10OE-02 2.83E-02 5.66E-03 1.41E-01
3 out of 3 4.62E-02 4.22E-02 8.45E-03 2.11 E-01
1 out of 1 1.88E-03 1.80E-03 6.01E-04 5.41E-03
Passive 2 out of 2 3.61E-02 3.46E-02 1.15E-02 1.04E-01
3 out of 3 5.40E-02 5.18E-02 1.73E-02 1.55E-01
4.3 Human Error
Human error that is dealt with in a PRA refers to mistakes by human activity made in the
performance of assigned tasks. Human error may occur in any phase of design,
manufacturing, construction, or operation. The literature shows that there is not a strong
consensus on the best way to capture all human actions and quantify human error
probabilities. In this study, we are concerned only with human reliability during system
operation, where human operators are expected to maintain, supervise, and control
complex systems.
The THERP model is used for the quantification of human error in this study. The data
used in the THERP model are obtained from the handbook of human reliability analysis
[NUREG/CR-1278] and AP1000 PRA report [AP1000PRA]. A brief introduction of the
THERP method and its procedure are presented in this section.
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Because the appropriate reliability data of pre-accident human error for our systems are
not available in the literature, we present two illustrative case studies that provide a
representative value of pre-accident human error. Human reliability analysis of AP1000
PRA is referred and incorporated into our system analysis for the post-accident human
error. Consequently, the sensitive analysis has been performed using epistemic models
corresponding error factors.
4.3.1 Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP)
THERP is a method to predict human error probabilities and to evaluate the degradation
of a man-machine system likely to be caused by human errors alone or in connection with
equipment functioning, operational procedures and practices, or other system and human
characteristics that influence system behavior [NUREC/CR-1278]. The method
represents operator behavior by simple equations dealing with factors such as plant
equipment parameters; hardware redundancy; human redundancy, training and stress.
A task analysis is used to determine the paths of operator actions that can lead to failure,
and these paths are modeled in an event tree. Using the THERP database, the
probabilities of failure and success for each action are determined. These probabilities are
adjusted to take into account the relevant performance shaping factors (PSFs) and
possible dependencies.
4.3.2 Performance Shaping Factor (PSF)
Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs) encompass those influences that enhance or degrade
human performance. Three kinds of PSFs are considered in the THERP method: stress
level, experience level, and task type. The stress level is divided into four levels: very low,
optimum, moderately high, and extremely high; experience level and task type each have
two features. The event tree of modification factor is presented in Figure 4-3.
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Stress Task type Experience Modifier
Level Level values
Low
Step-by-Step
Optimum Skilled
Dynamic Novice
F
1
2
Moderately 4
high 5
10
5
Extremely 10
high 0.25*
0.5*
* These are the actual HEPs. They are NOT modifier values
Figure 4-3 Performance Shaping Factor Event Tree according to stress level, task
type and skill (NUREG/CR-1278)
4.3.3 THERP procedure (NUREG/CR-1278)
The THERP approach uses conventional system reliability analysis modified to account
for possible human errors. Instead of generating equipment system states, THERP
produces possible human task activities and the corresponding human error probabilities.
THERP analysis is carried out in the four steps described below.
Step 1. Define system failures of interest
: Possible human interaction points and task characteristics and their impacts are
identified in this step through examination of system operation and analysis of system
safety. Then screening is performed in order to determine critical actions that require
detailed analysis.
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Step 2. List and analyze related human actions
: A detailed task analysis and human error analysis is developed by means of the HRA
event tree. The necessary task steps and their required human performance are outlined.
The analyst then determines the errors (omission and commission in Table 4-5) that could
possibly occur. Human recovery actions should be taken into account in order to prevent
overestimation of human error. Errors are categorized depending on their characteristic.
Table 4-5 Error Categories defined by THERP Model
Errors of omission - Omit a step or the entire task
Select the wrong control, choose theSelection error
wrong procedures
Errors of commission Sequence error Actions carried out in the wrong orderErrors of commission
Time error Actions carried out too early / too late
Qualitative error Action is done too little / too much
Step 3. Estimate relevant error probabilities
: Human error probabilities (HEPs) are assigned in the failure branches in the HRA event
tree. The handbook ofhuman reliability analysis [NUREG/CR-1278] provides data tables
for HEPs and PSFs. In addition to the handbook data source, specific recorded data,
subjective judgment, or simulation data can be used in the estimation.
Step 4. Estimate effects of error on system failure events
: Human error tasks are incorporated into the system reliability framework. Figure 4-4,
demonstrates the inclusion level of human error in the fault tree model depending on the
varieties of human error. Consequently, the contribution of human errors to system
reliability or availability can be estimated.
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4.3.4 Inclusion of HRA in system analysis
Human errors can be classified into three categories depending on the time phase of the
error: pre-accident, accident-cause 39, and post-accident human error. An operator's role
changes over these time phases: from nominal maintenance and operation activities,
which are directly familiar procedures, to incident investigation and management, and
then to emergency response. Here, we are only concerned about pre-accident and post-
accident human errors.
Pre-accident tasks typically of interest in a PRA consist of routine and corrective
maintenance, calibration, surveillance tests, and restoration [NUREG/CR-4772]. Pre-
accident human errors are modeled according to the level of components or trains in a
fault tree analysis and contribute to unavailability of corresponding components or trains.
Post-accident tasks include all human activities required to cope with an abnormal event
that disrupt the normal conditions in a plant. Post-accident tasks are divided into
diagnosis and post-diagnosis (recovery) actions. Post-accident human errors usually are
dealt with on the top level of the fault tree independent of hardware failure. Figure 4-4
shows where these human errors are incorporated into a PRA model.
We present two illustrative analyses for the pre-accident human error using the THERP
method. Realistic analysis requires more detailed work and PSF evaluation. We use the
result of human error probability (HEP) tentatively as a representative probability of pre-
accident human error and incorporate the HEP into the hardware failure of .the active and
passive design. A generic value of pre-accident HEP is about 0.03 that is adopted for
39 Accident-cause human error directly induces an off-normal condition and leads to
unplanned reactor shutdown. This contributes to the failure rate of initiating events.
Since our study focuses on only one system level, we are not concerned about this error.
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various HRA methods (e.g. ASEP 4 0 and RMIEP 41) [NUREG/CR-4772].
The analysis of post-accident human error has been performed depending on active and
passive design. For the active system operation, the potential human errors that may arise
in the procedure of EDG start, MOV open, and ARHR alignment are analyzed. For
passive system operation, the procedures of AOV actuation, the recognition of PRHR
actuation after SG inventory is exhausted, and the PRHR alignment are analyzed. These
results are presented in Table 4-7, and the detailed HRAs of each items presented in
Appendix B.
st-accident
man error
dent
error
Figure 4-4 Level of incorporation of human failure events in PRA model (from
Dougherty, 1988)
40 Accident Sequence Evaluation Program.
41 Risk Methods Integration and Evaluation Program.
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Pre-Accident Human Error Analysis
Pre-accident human error is quantified in terms of two phases such as an action and
recovery phase. Pre-accident human error refers to inappropriate maintenance, test and
correction for stand by equipment. This is termed "latent" because such errors leave
equipment in an undiscovered and inoperable state. Individual events of these tasks do
not contribute significantly to system failure. However, repetitive and habitual errors
combined with equipment failure result in unavailability of components, which may have
a crucial impact on overall system failure.
A typical example of this error is that of an unavailable pump or heat exchanger for
which front and back valves are not returned to the original position after test or
maintenance. Another example includes miscalibration of equipment due to errors of
commission in reading and recording from unannunciated displays. Miscalibration may
arise in recalibration or adjustment of water level or temperature gauge of the IRWST;
the speed controllers of pumps; or air pressure level gauge which provide consistent air to
AOVs. The quantification of these errors needs to consider the maintenance or test work
environment, equipment maintainability, the existence of procedures, skills of personnel,
and stress levels of personnel. The PSF values of Figure 4-3 are used to evaluate these
effects. The basic assumptions of the analysis are that all work is performed based upon
documented procedures and at least two personnel should attend to the work place.
1) Non-Restored Valve after Test and Maintenance
Two successive tasks can cause a system to be unavailable. First, an operator carries out
the work with a particular procedure. However, the operator omits a particular work step
related to returning the valve position because the procedure is complex and has a long
list. Second, the personnel (supervisor or co-worker) who are in attendance of the work
place along with the operator were not aware of the non-restored valve state. The first
task corresponds to the second item of Table 20-7 in the THERP handbook [NUREG/CR-
1278] and the second task corresponds to first item of Table 20-22 in THERP handbook.
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The operator's stress level, skill, and work type are considered to be the performance
shaping factors (PSFs).
2) Miscalibration
Miscalibration has a more complex structure in error analysis than the case of a non-
restored valve. This includes not only omission error but also commission error. However,
we do not take into account commission error in this analysis. Miscalibration can be
initiated by two work steps. One is work procedure omission with checkoff and the other
is misreading of the calibration. These correspond to the second item of Table 20-7 and
the first item of Table 20-10 in the THERP handbook, respectively. PSF factors and
recovery actions are considered in the same manner as the non-restored case.
Table 4-6 Two illustrative analysis of pre-accident human error probability
Work Mean Recovery Modified
Description HEP Factor HEP
Non-restored Operator omits 0.003 2 0.1 0.0006
Valve a work step
0.003 5 0.1 0.0015
a work step
Miscalibration
Operator misleads 0.003 4 0.1 0.0012
the calibration
Total 0.0033
Post-accident Human Error Analysis
Post-accident human error is quantified in terms of diagnosis and recovery actions. In
contrast to the pre-accident model, the post-accident model requires diagnosis time for
figuring out what to do when an abnormal event has been recognized. The probability of
diagnosis is obtained in terms of allowable diagnosis time by referring to the evaluation
probability model of human diagnosis tasks, which evaluate human error probability
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according to the allowable time of a diagnosis task. The evaluation model of diagnosis
probability is presented in Appendix C. Probability of action and recovery is obtained in
the same manner as pre-accident HRA.
The results of post-accident HRA are presented in Table 4-7. Four case studies are
performed for active design and three case studies are performed for passive design. The
first procedure of each case consists of diagnosis. The detailed analysis is presented in
Appendix B.
Table 4-7 Post-accident human error data referenced from AP1000 PRA
Design Errors in Human Actions HEP EF
Failure to recognize the need and failure to start the
2.67E-3 3onsite standby EDG during a loss of offsite power.
Failure to recognize the need and failure to open the 2.12E-3 3
MOVs during shutdown conditions.
Active Failure to recognize the need and failure to align the 2.90E-3 3
ARHR during loss of offsite power.
Failure to recognize the need and failure to manually
transfer the ARHR pumps to EDG power source 4.17E-33
following loss of offsite power with failure of
automatic transfer during shutdown conditions.
Failure to recognize the need and failure to actuate 1.48E-4 31.48E-43
the AOVs during loss of offsite power
Failure to recognize the need the need of PRHR
Passive operation following loss of main feedwater during an 5.02E-4 3
accident.
Failure to align the PRHR, given loss of main 2.55E3 3
feedwater during a transient.
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4.3.5 Uncertainty of human error probability
The distribution taken here is the lognormal. Swain and Guttmann [NUREG/CR-1278]
suggest use of the lognormal distribution on the grounds that the performance of skilled
personnel tends to shift toward the lower HEPs 42. The following is a representation of
uncertainty for post-accident human error probability when the value of 3 is assumed as
an error factor.
Table 4-8 Epistemic model for HEPs using lognormal distribution
Human error probability (Post-accident event)
Design 5th 95th
mean median 9 5thpercentile percentile
Active 1.19E-02 1.14E-02 3.79E-03 3.41E-02
Passive 3.20E-03 3.07E-03 1.02E-03 9.20E-03
4.4 Common Cause Failure
Common cause failures (CCFs) are root-cause events leading directly to multiple
component failures from the shared causes. CCFs are significant because they lead to
simultaneous failure of redundant components. Therefore, they can prevent the maximum
theoretical gain in reliability being achieved by adding redundant components/trains.
CCFs arise because the components are susceptible to the same failure causes. There are
three basic groups of common-cause failures:
1. Design/Manufacturing/Construction/Installation Inadequacy or Internal Causes:
This root-cause event generally affects similar components. It includes actions and
decisions made during design, manufacturing, or installation of components--both before
and after the plant is operational. The malfunctioning of something internal to the
component as a result of intrinsic wear or other failure is included in this category.
42 Since we are modeling a probability, which must lie in the interval [0,11, the
distribution has to be truncated.
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2. Abnormal Environmental Stress:
Abnormal environmental stress includes root causes related to a harsh environment that is
not within component specific design criteria. These root-cause events affect equipment
in the same location that is also sensitive to the same harsh environment.
3. Maintenance or Operation Errors:
Human interactions, particularly errors in maintenance, operation, or tests performed by
inappropriate procedures or manners, direct results of a shared cause of failure to multiple
components.
In this work, CCF analysis of multiple components is performed using the specific data
referenced from AP 1000 PRA results. The CCF analysis of the redundant loop for active
and cooperative loop for passive is performed using the Multiple Greek Letter Model.
Multiple Greek Letter (MGL) Model
The Multiple Greek Letter model [Fleming et al, 1986] is an extension of the beta factor
model. In this method, other parameters in addition to the beta factor are introduced to
distinguish among common cause events affecting different numbers of components in a
higher level of redundancy. For a system of m redundant components, m-1 different
parameters are defined. For example, for m=4 the model includes the following 3
parameters:
- 3: conditional probability that the common cause of an item will be shared by one or
more additional items,
- y: conditional probability that the common cause of an item failure that is shared by one
or more items will be shared by two or more items in addition to the first,
- 8: conditional probability that the common cause of an item failure shared by two or
more items will be shared by three or more items in addition to the first,
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Table 4-9 shows the generic values of MGL parameters for active (pumps) and passive
(air operated valve) design. The Beta factor for EDGs and MOVs are used: 0.05 and 0.08,
respectively, referenced from [Marshall, 1995].
Table 4-9 MGL parameters for active (pump) and passive (AOV)
Modarres [1999] and AP1000 PRA [2002]
design from
The general equation that expresses the frequency of multiple component failures due to
common cause, Q(m)k, in terms of the MGL parameter is
k'm rn I - _( )(1- Ok+I)Q_
m-1 CA-1 i=1
(5-1)
01 =1, 0, = 3 , 3 = 7,--,0 + 0
k =l,..,m
where m refers to the total number of loops or components and k refers to number of
common cause failures. The number of parameters is always one less than system size.
Table 4-10 shows multiple loop failure probability of common cause failure for the case
of one to four loop configurations.
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Number of Active (pump) Passive (AOV)
components p 
_ p 6
2 0.1 x x 0.078 x x
3 0.1 0.27 x 0.078 0.93 x
4 0.11 0.42 0.4 0.078 0.93 0.77
Table 4-10 Multiple loop failure probability of common cause failure
# of Loop Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
1 Loop Qt - -
2 Loop (1- p) Qt Pq
3 Loop (1- p) Qt (1/2) P(1-y) Qt 7 Qt -
4 Loop (1- p) Qt (1/3) P(1-y) Qt (1/3) P y(1-6) Qt P Y 6 Qt
Qt refers to the total failure frequency of the loop on account of all independent and
common cause events. And Qk refers to the probability of common cause failure among k
specific components.
* Qi: single component failure without common cause failure
* Q2: two components common cause failure
* Q3: three components common cause failure
* Q4: four components common cause failure.
The rare event approximation is used to calculate the total probability of failure with the
consideration of common cause failure. Table 4-11 presents common cause failure
equations for three different cases of redundant and cooperative configurations
respectively.
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Table 4-11 CCF Failure equation corresponding to loop number and configuration
Configuration Loop Representation
2 (q + Q2 = (1 - )2 q2+q
Redundant 3Redundant 3 3 QQ2 + = - (1 - fl)/3(l - y) q2 +flyq(1-out-of-k) 3 3Q2 +Q =  (1-)(1-)q
4 224 4QQ3+6Q2 +Q4 =-(1-f)fy(1-8)q 2 +2fl (Y) 2 q +fl/q3 3
2 2Q +Q2 =2(1-,8)q+flq]
Cooperative 3 3Q +3Q + Q =3(1-fl)q+3 f(1--7)q+flyq
(k-out-of-k) 2
44 4Q +6Q +4Q 3 + Q4= 4(1-,f)q+28(1-)q +- fy(1-3)q+/Jy7q3
4.5 Comprehensive comparison of active and passive designs
Functional failure probability was investigated in Chapter 3, and the analysis of human
error and hardware failure probability taking into account common cause failure was
presented in the previous section. In this section, a comprehensive comparison of active
and passive designs is presented with consideration of all of these failure modes.
The system failure probabilities are evaluated depending upon an increase of loop
configurations which were previously defined in Section 4.1. Their major failure modes
are discussed for each loop configuration. The methods of reducing major failure and
their limitations are discussed in this section.
Table 4-12 presents a result of single loop analysis of the active and passive design.
Hardware and post-accident human error are the dominant failure modes in the active
design. On the other hand, functional failure is an outstanding failure mode in the passive
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design. Thus, one more redundant loop needs to be added in the active design in order to
reduce hardware failure probability. Also, one more cooperative loop needs to be added
in the passive system in order to reduce functional failure probability by means of
increasing heat removal capacity. The failure probability of single loop passive design is
too high for practical purposes in the example investigated.
Table 4-12 Failure Probabilities of one loop active and passive designs
Hardware Human Error probability Functional System
Design Failure Pre Post Failure Failure
Probability -accident -accident Probability Probability
Active 1.62E-02 3.90E-03 1.19E-02 6.67E-03 3.87E-02
Passive 1.88E-03 3.30E-03 3.20E-03 7.23E-01 7.31E-01
Table 4-13 presents the result of two loop analysis of the active and passive design. We
defined this configuration as the reference design in our study. In the active design, total
system failure is reduced to around 26% of single loop failure. The theoretical reduction
in failure probability is not achieved because of common cause failure and inflexible
characteristics of EDG failure and human error (post-accident).
Table 4-13 Failure Probabilities of two loop active and passive designs
Hardware Human Error probability Functional System
Design Failure Pre Post Failure Failure
Probability -accident -accident Probability Probability
Active 9.09E-03 1.00E-03 1.19E-02 6.67E-03 2.86E-02
Passive 3.61E-03 6.34E-03 3.20E-03 3.54E-02 4.85E-02
In this step, hardware failure and functional
alternative options to reduce system failures.
failure becomes comparable. There are two
One is to reduce hardware failure by adding
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one more redundant loop. And the other is to reduce functional failure by adding one
more cooperative loop. Based upon the numerical calculation of these two cases, we
identified the first method as being more effective than the other.
Total system failure probability in the passive system decreased significantly by adding
an additional cooperative loop in the single passive system. However, functional failure is
still a major failure mode in the two loop passive design. Thus, one more addition of the
cooperative loop is needed for the passive design.
Table 4-14 presents a result of three loop analysis of the active and passive design. In the
active design, human error (post-accident) and power source (EDGs) contribute the most
of failure probability in the system. Without any changes or improvements in those
failure modes, 2.30E-02 is a near minimum achievable failure probability in the active
design. More reduction in the system failure probability requires an additional installment
of EDG, which requires significant cost, or decrease of human error probability (post-
accident), which requires more disciplined operator education or emergency procedures.
Table 4-14 Failure Probabilities of three loop active and passive designs
Hardware Human Error probability Functional System
Design Failure Pre Post Failure Failure
Probability -accident -accident Probability Probability
Active 9.64E-03 1.16E-03 1.19E-02 3.20E-04 2.30E-02
Passive 5.40E-03 9.50E-03 3.20E-03 9.20E-03 2.71E-02
The results of the passive design analysis shows an increase in hardware failure
probability and human error (pre-accident) probability because the number of
components, which are required to work together when the passive system needs to be
actuated, is increased due to used of cooperative configurations. Further, functional
failure still is not ignorable. The probability of these failure modes can be reduced by
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means of adding additional redundant loops or cooperative loops. However, we leave
these further analyses for future study.
Figure 4-5 shows a comparison of failure probability according to loop configurations
and failure modes of active and passive designs. Generally, active configurations show
better results than passive configurations due to functional failures.
A more extensive comparison may require including uncertainty of each mode such as
hardware, human error and functional failure. The consideration of these uncertainties
can make the results different from original comparisons that we present in this section.
For example, it is generally accepted that human error, in particular post-accident, has a
large uncertainty in its evaluation. If you take into account a stated extent of this
uncertainty, a passive system can show greater reliability than that of the active system.
Active vs. Passive
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Figure 4-5 Failure probability of active and passive design according to loop
configurations
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4.6 Summary
This chapter presents a comprehensive comparison of active and passive systems
including hardware failure, human error, common cause failure, and functional failure.
The analysis of hardware failure uses a conventional fault tree analysis with component
reliability data which are obtained from an EPRI database and AP1000 PRA report. The
results of hardware failure analysis for the two designs show that the active design has a
higher level of failure probability than the passive system using the same number of loops.
The active system reliability is not affected by use of an additional loop (2--3) because
of the consistently high failure probability of power source (EDG). In the cooperative
passive system, as the loop number increases, hardware failure also increases slightly.
Human error analysis is performed by the THERP method. Two representative case
studies are performed to determine pre-accident human error. Post-accident human error
probability refers to the results of AP1000 PRA. In general, passive systems are credited
to dispense with human error. However, based upon our study, pre-accident human error
can be a potential risk source in the passive system, particularly due to maintenance,
repair, or in service inspection work, for example, concerning to heat exchangers, water
lines, or air-operated valves. Post-accident human error contributes to a significant
portion of system failure probability in active design. The effect of post-accident human
error on the passive design is relatively small. Common cause failure is considered in
evaluation of the system redundancy. The Multiple Greek Letter (MGL) model is used.
Due to CCF, the redundancy effect of component in the active system is less influential
than otherwise.
In conclusion, the numerical results show that passive systems may possibly be less
reliable than active systems once functional failure is considered. An analysis performed
by a conventional PRA, which does not consider the stochastic impact of safety margins,
may provide a misleading evaluation of the performance of passive systems.
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Chapter 5 Flexibility Concept Applied to Nuclear Safety systems
5.1 Background and Motivation
It is generally accepted that passive systems are more reliable and economic than active
systems. However, the results of Chapters 3 and 4 shows that a passive system is not
more reliable than the active system when functional failure takes into account the
example investigated. Moreover, considering the implications of flexibility upon remedial
cost due to potential detrimental effects incurred by unexpected operating conditions or
system status, passive systems cannot always be regarded as more economic than active
systems.
Devine (2003) addresses this flexibility concept in comparison of passive and active
design: "Passive natural circulation systems buy great dividends in simplification and
reliability, but, on the contrary, there is the evident loss of flexibility compared with
active cooling systems with AC driven centrifugal pumps," suggesting that passive
systems are less flexible than active ones.
Unfortunately, other than this brief remark, there are few explanations in the literature
regarding flexibility, and few attempts have been made to formally define, quantify, and
propose ways for achieving flexibility in nuclear safety.
We attempt to establish a concrete flexibility concept in nuclear safety systems and to
identify the distinctive features of flexibility in terms of passive and active design. Based
upon these features, the comparison of passive and active design in terms of flexibility is
presented by illustrative case studies.
An approach that investigates other engineering systems such as manufacturing and
networks is performed. A concept elicited from the literature puts forth the notion that
flexibility is "the ability to cope with changes." The characteristics of the changes are
identified in system design space, which consists of two coordinates: design variables and
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system performance. Depending upon the variation of design variables and system
performance, two design characteristics (robustness and flexibility) are defined. The
equations for quantifications of robustness and flexibility are presented.
Based upon the definition and governing equations of system robustness and flexibility,
an illustrative attempt to compare an active and passive design in terms of robustness and
flexibility is performed given specified situations.
5.2 Flexibility in Engineering System: A Literature Review
Engineering systems have various evaluation elements in design such as cost, function,
reliability, and performance. Flexibility is also one of the important elements to be
considered in the design of engineering systems. These days, the importance of flexibility
is emphasized in those systems that have long-term operation. We looked into the
literature of flexibility as applied to manufacturing systems and network-based systems43
in order to investigate a concrete concept of flexibility in nuclear safety systems.
5.2.1 Manufacturing Systems
The research on flexibility that has been done in manufacturing systems is by far the
richest among all engineering systems. We look at a definition of flexibility in
manufacturing first.
Zelenovic (1982) defines flexibility as the ability of a system to adapt to change in
environmental conditions and in process requirements. He introduced two concepts in a
measure of flexibility. One is design adequacy, which refers to the probability that the
system will adapt itself to environmental conditions and to the process requirements
within the limits of the given design parameters. The other is adaptation flexibility, which
refers to the value of time needed for system transformation/adaptation from one to
another job task.
43 The instances of network-based system is telecommunications, energy and
transportation
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Newman et al. (1993) define flexibility as a fundamental instrument for dealing with
uncertainty. Correa (1994) states that flexibility is a characteristic of the interface
between a system and its external environment. To summarize, flexibility can be viewed
as a filter or buffer of the system when it needs to respond to external perturbations or
uncertainty.
Browne et al. (1984) classify manufacturing flexibility using the following dimensions in
accordance with the type of changes in production process:
* Volume flexibility: the ability of a production system to handle changes in daily or
weekly volume of the same product, thus allowing the factory to operate profitably at
varying overall production levels.
* Product mix flexibility: the ability to manufacture a variety of products without major
modification of existing facilities.
* Routing flexibility: the ability to process a given set of parts on alternative machines.
* Operation flexibility: the ability to interchange the ordering of operations on a given
part, thus allowing the ease of scheduling of its production.
Figure 5-1 depicts flexibility as a role of buffer that absorbs environmental impacts while
the system is in operation. In addition, it shows the dimensions of flexibility that depend
on changes that take place in manufacturing systems.
Volume Product Routing Operation
Flexibility i lxty exibility FlexibilitynFlexibility
Figure 5-1 Flexibility in manufacturing systems is understood as a buffer from
external uncertainty [Correa, 1994] and has four dimensions [Brown et al, 1984]
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5.2.2 Network Systems
Many engineering systems are network-based. That is, they consist of a set of nodes and
links with information, matter, or energy flowing through the different nodes from one to
the other.
The view of network systems on flexibility has been introduced by Moses (2003) who
defines flexibility as the degree of ease with which one implements classes of changes in
its specifications. In networks, when an alternative route is required, flexibility makes it
easier to implement the route with a small increase of new nodes, interconnections and
modifications of existing ones. Flexibility can be viewed as an active and comprehensive
approach to managing change [Nilchiani, 2005].
Network flexibility has three dimensions that are discussed in accordance with changing
objects and comprehensive coordination of the changes. Feitelson et al. (1999) classify
network flexibility using the following dimensions:
* Node flexibility: the ease with which network nodes are expanded. The ease can be
measured by time and cost to plan, approve and implement the development of a node.
This cost refers to the marginal cost of expanding the network by one node.
* Link flexibility: the ease and cost of building an additional link between nodes.
* Temporal flexibility: the ability to implement infrastructure investments timely and to
provide the appropriate coordination of the investments among users.
Figure 5-2 shows an extension of a network with additional nodes and links and
associated time and cost. Flexibility is defined with marginal cost and time of extension
and divided into three dimensions depending on changing objects and comprehensive
coordination of the changes.
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Figure 5-2 Flexibility in network system is the degree of easiness to implement new
routs [Moses, 2003] and has three dimensions [Feitelson et al, 1999]
The review of the existing definitions and dimensions of flexibility for manufacturing and
network-based engineering systems shows a multitude of perspectives on the concept of
flexibility. From this, we can derive a general concept of flexibility as the degree of the
ability to cope with changes timely and cost-effectively.
5.3 Flexibility in System Design
Since our purpose is the comparison of active and passive design in terms of flexibility, it
is necessary to discuss the flexibility concept from the perspective of different designs. In
this way, the characteristics of flexibility can be further clarified.
In particular, the distinction between robustness and flexibility is focused on since these
two are subjects rich with ambiguity. The following discussion shows how a design
concept evolves from optimized design through robust design to flexible design.
5.3.1 Optimized Design
The system design space consists of two dimensions, represented by Figure 5-3. The
horizontal axis (X axis) represents design variables composed of input parameters such as
operating temperature, pressure, time, or power. The vertical axis (Y axis) represents the
value of performance in general and the value of reliability in safety systems.
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Optimization can be understood as focusing the capabilities of a system on a given
mission. By focusing the capabilities of a system on a single mission, the designer is able
to maximize the performance of the given mission as shown in Figure 5-3. Through
removing unnecessary capabilities, the system can be more cost-effective. However, a
small deviation in design valuables due to changes in operating conditions or
manufacturing variability is not compatible with the expected performance of the systems
because the systems are optimized by removing all capabilities that are not necessary to
fulfill the currently specified functionalities [Mark, 2005]. In order to obtain consistent
performance in spite of the deviation of design variables the advanced design concepts
should be considered.
Performance
M
(target
P Design Variable
Figure 5-3 Optimized design at a design variable and performance
5.3.2 Robust Design
Robust design 44 is a design strategy developed in order to keep consistent system
performance despite manufacturing variability and variations in the operating conditions,
represented by the horizontal axis in Figure 5-4 [Saleh et al, 2001]. In this design mode,
although we lose some amount of performance (M--+M') compared with the optimized
44 This design concept was developed in the late 1950s by Genishi Tagushi (1987) and
builds upon idea from statistical experimental design.
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design, we can facilitate consistent performance through the assignment of a new design
variable band (Figure 5-4).
For instance, if we explain robustness in the case of purchasing a car, a customer wants
one that will start readily in northern Canada in the winter and not overheat in southern
Arizona in the summer. This demonstrates the robustness of systems with respect to
variances of environmental temperature.
Robustness is a characteristic of a system whose performance is least sensitive to
variations in operating environment, variation in raw material, or variation in
manufacturing. Because robust design allows some variations in raw materials, it does
not need to use exclusively high grade material. In addition, robust design can reduce
unnecessary labor and material cost in order to satisfy variations in manufacturing [Saleh
et al, 2001].
The trade-off element of robust design compared with optimized design is the additional
initial cost incurred by implementing consistent system performance. Robust design
considers the change of only one design dimension (X axis) in system design space.
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Figure 5-4 Robust design considering uncertainty of design variables
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5.3.3 Flexible Design
When a system requires a modification that directs the system to be higher performance
or reliability, the ability to accommodate the requirement of the modification timely and
cost-effectively should be considered. This ability refers to flexibility in this context.
Flexible design not only considers changes in design variables but also considers changes
in system performance and its corresponding cost (Figure 5-5)
For instance, if someone wants to install a hi-fidelity audio system in a car, modifications
should be done to satisfy the driver's preference. In this case, how the modification is
performed timely and cost effectively determines flexibility of the car. A design that
extracts the old audio system and replaces it with new one in an easy way lower time and
the cost associated with the modification. If the car has sufficient electrical power to
provide electricity to the new audio system or it has extra space to install the auxiliary
components, modification of the car would be even simpler.
Thus, a design is considered flexible when it is easily changeable and can be used in a
variety of ways. The time and cost required to implement the changes are two indicators
of the "ease of change" of a design and reflect its flexibility [Saleh et al, 2001]. The
flexibility45 includes a cost concept in its evaluation, which is a main distinction from the
design concepts of robustness.
45 Saleh defined adaptability as flexibility in his work and distinguish it from robustness
and universality. But we define flexibility within broader spectrum in design space.
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Design Vadable
Figure 5-5 Flexible design considering performance change accompanied by
modification cost
5.3.4 Evolution of Design
Design strategy evolves depending on the uncertainty of design variables and the changes
of performances (Figure 5-6). Optimized design is preferred for the systems that have a
short lifetime cycle and for which their operating conditions do not expect much
fluctuation. Since it removes all capabilities that are not necessary to fulfill the currently
specified functionalities, optimized design can be simpler and more economic than other
designs.
However, when the system faces operational uncertainties such as changes in design
variables, operating conditions or manufacturing variability, or operational requests such
as slight changes of functions or performances, optimized design is not a good option for
the system to fulfill the expected performance or function.
Robust design can afford such operational uncertainties, and system robustness plays a
role of a buffer which absorbs the impacts of design variable uncertainty. If system
robustness is not sufficient to accommodate operating uncertainty, or there are new
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requirements to change the system performance, the system needs to be modified. In such
a case, the advanced design strategy, flexibility, should be taken into account in order to
perform the modification timely and cost-effectively.
System
Performance
Changing
Fixed
Inadequate
Design
Optimized
Design
m=,•,A
Fixed Changing
Design Evolution
Design
Variable
Figure 5-6 Design evolution according to the change of design variable and
performance. Modified from Saleh (2001)
The graphical representation of these design characteristics is presented in Figure 5-7.
Robustness and flexibility handle the operational uncertainty and the change of
performances.
Roboustness Flexibility
Figure 5-7 Robustness and Flexibility as system buffers for changes of design
variable and performance
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5.4 Robustness and Flexibility in Nuclear Safety Systems
The overview of flexibility from other engineering systems allows us to both identify the
characteristic of flexibility as well as distinguish it from robustness.
The ability to cope with system operational changes corresponds to robustness: deviations
of design variables, operating conditions, or manufacturing variability. On the other hand,
the ability to cope with system performance changes due to external requirements
corresponds to flexibility: the new performance or functionalities due to such factors as
user (utility or regulatory) request, technology innovation, safety recovery, or change of
regulation.
Robustness: insensitivity of system reliability to operational uncertainty
A robust design can be defined as one for which the reliability characteristics are highly
insensitive to variations in design variables or operating conditions. Such variations can
be interpreted as epistemic uncertainty, which was discussed in chapter 3. The
measurement of epistemic uncertainty in terms of system reliability is functional failure.
Thus, the degree of insensitivity of functional failure to a Specified Situation (SS) can
represent the degree of robustness in a system. A robust system can cope with an increase
of epistemic uncertainty without altering the performance or reliability of the system.
For instance, generally active RHR systems can be regarded as more operationally robust
than passive systems. Because the active systems have a sufficient safety margin in heat
removal capacity due to external power sources, their heat removal performance is not
affected much in spite of operational uncertainty as shown in Figure 5-8. An actual
comparison of an active and passive system is presented in Section 5.5.
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Figure 5-8 Reliability variation in accordance with capacity of active and passive
system taking into account operational uncertainty
Robustness (Reliability insensitivity):
Robustness is measured by the degree of insensitivity of functional failure to a given
specified situation (SS).
Robustness =- (5-1)AFunctional Failure Probability(/ SS)
where AFunctional_Failure_Probability refers to a difference between the original
probability of functional failure and that of the specified situation. SS refers to a given
specified situation.
Flexibility (cost-effectiveness of modification):
Flexibility can be defined as the ratio of reliability enhancement (output) to the marginal
required cost in order to satisfy a requirement.
AR marginal reliabilityFlexibility(external) - A - marginal
AC marginal cost
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(5-2)
In Chapter 4, we discussed a method of evaluating reliability of passive and active
systems. The costs of modifications of these two designs can be estimated differently
depending on the required time of the modifications in the design and operation stage.
Finally, flexibility of passive and active designs can be quantified with respect to the
reliabilities and costs. Detailed case studies are presented in Section 5.5.
5.5 Quantification of Robustness and Flexibility
Robustness is evaluated in accordance with Equation (5-1) which measures the change of
functional failure in a given situation. The specific situations are assumed to measure the
operation flexibility: power uprating and heat exchanger plugging.
The requirements of the safety enhancement for these two cases are considered and
flexibilities of each case are evaluated. The flexibility is calculated in accordance with
Equation (5-2) which includes measure of reliability results of modification and their
corresponding costs.
In Chapter 4, we obtained results of failure analysis and compared active and passive
designs depending on their failure modes. In order to measure robustness, we start from
our reference design46 that we defined Section 4-1 (active 1-out-of- 2 and passive 2-out-
of-2).
As shown in Table 5-1, the respective failure probabilities in terms of failure mode are
not significantly different. However, the functional failure probability of a passive system
is much greater then that of an active system. These reference designs show intrinsic
features of active and passive design: high failure probability in hardware and human
error in active design and high functional failure in passive design due to insufficient
safety margins.
4 6 Detailed component configuration refers to Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2.
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5.5.1 Robustness Evaluation for two loop active and two loop passive system
Robustness is evaluated in two given specified situations for which flexibility is
considered when safety enhancements are required after being fielded.
Table 5-1 Failure Probability of active systems (1 out of 2) versus passive systems (2
out of 2)
Failure Probability
Failure Mode Active Passive Comment
(1 out of 2) (2 out of 2)
Hardware (HW) 9.09E-03 3.61E-03 Passive Better
Functional (FF) 6.67E-03 3.54E-02 Active Better
Human (HE) 1.29E-02 9.54E-03 Passive Better
Total 2.86E-02 4.85E-02 Active Better
We considered two specified situations: power uprating and heat exchanger plugging.
The impact of these situations is evaluated by the insensitivity of functional failure
probability for the specified situations, which represents system robustness in this context.
The first case represents the increase of load distribution. Due to the power uprating, the
decay power level is increased to 20% as shown in Figure 5-9. Because the capacity of
passive systems is smaller than that of active systems, this change is much more
influential to the functional failure probability of passive design than active design.
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Densityfunction
LOAD
parameter
Figure 5-9 Case 1: Decay power increase (20%) due to the power uprating (Load
increase)
The second case represents the decrease of heat removal capacity of each design. The
heat exchanger plugging due to system degradation deteriorate the heat removal capacity
of each system. However, because the active design has a lager safety margin initially,
the impact of this change is not significant to the overall active design. On the other hand,
the passive system is more vulnerable to such uncertain situations.
Density
function
LOAD
parameter
Figure 5-10 Heat exchanger plugging (20%) due to system degradation (Capacity
decreased)
The evaluation of these operation flexibilities in terms of change of functional failure
probability are presented in Table 5-2.
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Table 5-2 Robustness evaluation for the two loop active and passive design
AR Robustness
CASE Operation
Uncertainty Active Passive Active Passive
(1 out of 2) (1 out of 2) (1 out of 2) (2 out of 2)
Q 20%1 2.3E-04 1.1E-01 4,347 9increase
HX 20%2 1.0OE-04 6.6E-02 10,000 15
plugging
Active design has greater robustness than passive design in these two cases. If a
regulatory board asks a utility to restore the degraded reliability to its original state, or a
utility wants to improve system reliability through increasing motive driving force,
system modifications have to be performed and the flexibility can be evaluated during
this work.
5.5.2 Comparative Flexibility Evaluation for two loop active and two loop passive
systems
The evaluation of flexibility consists of two steps. The first is reliability analysis and the
second is cost analysis. Reliability analysis for these cases of modification is presented in
Section 4.5. In order to increase the safety margin or heat removal capacity of our
reference configuration (2 loop system), the active design needs to install one more pump
and gain a reliability of 6.35E-03 (3 loop system). On the other hand, two options are
considered in the reliability enhancement of the passive design: The first is an increase of
the heat exchanging surface by installing another loop. The second is an increase of the
system thermal center height. The reliability gains of each option are 2.62E-02 (3 loop
system) and 2.29E-02 (2 loop + 50% increased thermal center height), respectively.
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The next step is the evaluation of the cost of the modification. Costs are evaluated based
upon equipment cost analysis (Appendix D). A detailed cost structure for active and
passive design according to increasing loop number is presented in Table 5-3 and Table
5-4, respectively. The installation costs at the design stage and operation stage are
naturally different. Additional cost is required in the modification during the operation
stage.
Table 5-3 Active System Modification Cost ($) Analysis
Loop MOV Pump HX Piping Loop System
One 97,732 73,300 160,173 34,450 365,655 365,655
Two 48,866 73,300 160,173 - 282,339 647,994
Three - 102,350 - - 102,350 750,344
Table 5-4 Passive System Modification Cost ($) Analysis
Loop AOV+MOV Check v/v HX Piping Loop System
One 73,299 14,600 160,173 34,450 282,522 282,522
Two 73,299 14,600 160,173 34,450 282,522 565,044
Three 102,348 20,470 274,424 80,650 477,892 1,042,936
Two + 249,258**
50%TC* 174,300 34,860 (IRWST) 80,650 539,068 1,104,11250%TC (IRWST)
* TC: thermal center height increase
**IRWST reconfiguration cost
The design stage cost is evaluated for the first and second loop and the operation stage
cost is evaluated for the third loop and thermal center height increase in the passive
system because we assumed that system operation starts already with the reference design
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(two loops). The modification of increasing thermal center height considered the re-
installment of all components including IRWST.
Table 5-5 shows the evaluation of flexibility for the reliability enhancement of the active
and passive system.
Table 5-5 Comparative Flexibility Evaluations for the two loop active
designs
and passive
Initial Design Modified Design
Failure Failure AR AC ($) FlexibilityFailure Failure
System Probability System Probability
Active Active 6.20E-08(one loop) 2.86E-02 (one loop 2.30E-02 6.35E-03 102,350
+a pump)
Passive Passive 5.48E-08
4.85E-02 (three 2.71E-02 2.62E-02 477,892
loop)
Passive
(two loop) Passive
(two loop 4.24E-08
4.85E-02 + 50% 2.56E-02 2.29E-02 539,068 '
increased
TC*
* TC: thermal center height
Table 5-5 shows that the modification flexibility of the active design is better than that of
the passive design. The reliability and cost effectiveness are incorporated into the concept
of flexibility. In terms of reliability gain, the passive system is superior to the active
system. However, in terms of the cost corresponding to the modification activity, the
active design is more effective than the passive design.
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The active system is more functionally modularized, that is the active system has
independently operating function. As a result, small functional module installments (e.g.
pumps) are possible. On the other hand, the passive system is not functionally
modularized. Thus, a whole loop installment or system reconfiguration for increasing
thermal center height is required in order to enhance system capacity.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we reviewed the flexibility concept in manufacturing and network
engineering systems. A key concept of flexibility is established: "the ability to cope with
changes." The characteristics of the changes are identified in system design perspectives.
Two sorts of changes (design variables and system performance) characterize two
concepts of design (robustness and flexibility). The equations for quantifications of
robustness and flexibility are presented and incorporated into the comparison of active
and passive systems.
Two case studies have been performed to evaluate robustness and flexibility. The results
of the case studies show active design are more robust and flexible than passive designs.
The excessive capacity and functional modularity make the active design superior to the
passive design.
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Chapter 6 Conclusions
Summary and Conclusions
A methodology for the evaluation of functional failure in the passive systems has been
proposed in this study. A demonstration of the methodology is performed by using a
passive residual heat removal system in the PWR concept. The Stochastic Response
Surface Method (SRSM) is adapted to create a computer simulation code and the Latin
Hypercube Sampling (LHS) method is used to increase sampling efficiency. Functional
failure probabilities for active and passive designs considering multiple loop
configurations are evaluated.
The results of functional failure are incorporated into the conventional PRA analysis,
which evaluate the failure of hardware, human error, and common cause failure. A
system level comprehensive comparison of example active and passive designs has been
performed. If functional failure is not considered, the study results suggest that passive
systems are more reliable than active systems, in accordance with the common
acceptance. However, when functional failure is considered, the study results contradict
this common acceptance, demonstrating that active systems are more reliable than
passive systems for the example studied.
More explicit comparison which takes into account cost analysis of these two systems is
performed in Chapter 5. The flexibility concept is defined and quantified as it applies to
the example nuclear safety system. Cost analysis shows that initial capital cost of passive
systems is lower than for active systems. However, needed modifications reflecting the
inflexibility of passive systems increase the total capital cost of the passive system.
Consequently, this study verified that the active system may become more economical
than the passive system, when the implications of system flexibility are considered.
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The results of our study raise doubts about the common understandings about passive
design: Passive design is more reliable and economic than active design. This study has
identified two potential detrimental factors in passive design: The first is high functional
failure probability and the second is low flexibility corresponding to potential remedial
cost. Figure 6-1 demonstrates this argument by presenting an illustrative example of the
active and passive design on a reliability-cost plane.
Common
I IIr~ •6 ,I:•
Reliabili
Without
Functional
Failure
With
Functional
Failure
Aility
ved
Fp)
r
Passive Active Active Passive COSt(2loop) (2loop) (3loop) (3 loop)
One Passive
pump- (2Loop+TC50%)
- One loop cost -
S50% Thermal Center increase -
Figure 6-1 Potential argument to common understanding in active and passive
designs (the figure is not to scale)
Without consideration of functional failure and flexibility, the reference design (2 loops)
of passive and active systems is located at P1 and Al, respectively. This is consistent
with the common understanding, which is that passive design is more reliable and
economic than active design.
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However, with the consideration of functional failure probability, the system locations
shift to P2 and A2 in Figure 6-1. That is, when considering the impact of functional
failure, the active system becomes more reliable than the passive system.
Moreover, the consideration of future requirements of reliability enhancement shifts the
system location to P3 and A3 in the figure. Due to the inflexible characteristics of the
passive system, now the passive system positioned at a less reliable and economic point
than the active system in the reliability-cost plane.
In conclusion, the final result for the example of this study directly contradicts the
common understanding, indicating that active designs may be more reliable and
economic than passive designs. This conclusion is not general, but the method used to
reach it is, and can be employed in future more detailed and realistic analyses in order to
reach general results.
The inclusion of uncertainty and flexibility in system design, using an approach such as
the one introduced in this study, will provide better information to decision makers.
It is worth noting that the purpose of this study is not to compare AP 1000 or AP 600 to
evolutionary plants. This study uses AP1000 or AP600 as a starting point of design and
selected a 2-loop (under capacity) passive system to compare against a 2-loop active
system as a way of illustrating a method. More detailed analysis is needed to provide
passive vs. active conclusion.
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Future work
In the following list, we highlight opportunities of further study.
Passive system reliability
In order to reduce computational burden and simplified demonstration of methodology,
this study modeled the system considering only steady-state conditions. It would be more
realistic to perform a complete analysis taking into account transient analysis which can
demonstrate the initial establishment of natural circulation. In addition, this study used
the available, but limited, design data sources for the purposes of methodology
illustration. More practically meaningful results can be obtained by the application of
comprehensive design data of real passive reactors.
Comprehensive comparison of active and passive design
The analysis performed only two case studies of the effects of pre-accident human error.
Pre-accident human error is regarded as an important risk factor in passive systems and
may result in a significant common cause failure when system operation is required.
More case studies and detailed analysis should be performed in further studies.
Flexibility concept development
This study introduced and developed flexibility at a conceptual level. More extensive
discussion including the design characteristics that make systems flexible and their
corresponding cost effect provides useful information.
Although the attempt has been made to choose realistic cost data based upon industrial
literature, the overall cost analysis of this study is arbitrary to some extent since this study
focuses on illustration of the flexibility concept. More realistic cost data in nuclear
industry--both capital cost and maintenance & operation costs-- can provide credible
information in the comparisons of active and passive systems.
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Appendix A: Principle of SRSM
Principle of SRSM
The equations A-la and A-lb characterize our problem. The combination of momentum
and energy equations can be written as two independent equations with two variables (x,
y). These equations include eight known functions, and six known constants as shown
below:
C1 9(x) 1 (y)+ C2 g2(x) f2(Y) =3 (A-la)
C4 g3 ( x) f3 (Y)+ C5g4 ( x) f4(Y) = C6  (A-lb)
In order to solve these non-linear and non-analytic equations, iteration methods are
usually used. However, the results of iteration can converge or diverge depending on the
initial guess values.
If we assign uncertainties to Cr- C4 , then the equations are defined differently in
accordance with each uncertain value selected randomly from the probability
distributions. In order to solve these equations, relevant initial guess values are required
in order to make each equation converge. Otherwise, the solution of the equations can be
complex numbers or can oscillate between two certain values.
A direct iteration is a better and more efficient method to obtain one or several case
solutions for these equations. However, in order to calculate a high volume of simulations
(over 5*10 3 times), we propose a new method, the Stochastic Response Surface Method
(SRSM). Since nominal values of solutions are known and the variations of Cr- C4 are
within predictable ranges, SRSM can have an advantage in simulations.
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In order to explain SRSM, let Zi and Z2 refer to Equation A-la and A-lb, respectively.
Z,(x, y) = Cg,(x) f(y)+ Cg 2 (x) (y) = CA(x, y)+ C2B(x, y)
Z2(x, y) = 4g3(x) 3(y)+ C5 • 4(x) (y) = C4c(x, y)+ C5D(x, y)
(A-2a)
(A-2b)
A: first term function of Z1 equation ; B: second term function of Z1 equation
C: first term function of Z2 equation ; D: second term function of Z2 equation
Since we know the nominal values, we can take advantage of assignments of domains
including expected solutions of the equations. For instance, if we use the nominal values
as centers of the x and y matrices with the appropriate ranges and mesh sizes, then x and
y matrices are shown as below:
Matrix47_X=[X(1),..., X(n), ... , X(2n)]
MatrixY=[Y(1),..., Y(m), ... , Y(2m)]
(A-3a)
(A-3b)
where X(n) and Y(m) are chosen as known nominal values.
Matrices of A(x,y), B(x,y), C(x,y), D(x,y), Zi(x, y), Z2(x,
row matrix X and column matrix Y, respectively. Thus Z,
below:
SZ, (x, y1)
Matrix Z1 = Z (x,, y)
Z (x2nY1)
y) are generated according to
and Z2 matrices are arranged
Z,(Xn, ym) (A-4a)
S.. Z,(x,y, 2m)
47 Matrix and Response Surface has same meaning in this context.
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Matrix_ Z2 =
Z'xy
Z2 (x, y1)
Z2(x, yI)
.. Z2(x,,y,) ... ('x,, y2 )
Z2(x,, Im)
Z,(x,. Y, )
(A-4b)
By applying a binary logic command in a computer program (Matlab 7.0) to the Z1
matrix, we can find a solution line of cells for nominal values (Fig. 4-5A). Like ZI, a
solution line of cells of Z2 for nominal values are determined as shown in Fig.4-5B.
"Find" command for the matrix Z1 and Z2:
Find C_3-eta < Z < C_3+eta
Find C_6-eta < Z2 < C_6+eta
(A-5a)
(A-5b)
where eta is numerical error range for finding solutions.
The intersection cells of the two solution lines of cells are the group of cells that we are
looking for. We obtain a solution set from the average of the solution cells.
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Figure A-1 The procedure of finding solutions in SRSM
line of cells in Z, (B) a solution line of cells in Z2 (C) solution cells from
ZI and Z2 solution lines.
Next, if uncertainty is assigned to Cj- C4, then the two equations are defined differently
according to each uncertain value selected randomly from the probability distributions.
C'=C'C* (A-6)
where C' is a real value of the quantity to be predicted, C is the result of the correlation or
the quantity having high variation characteristic in thermal performance and r denotes an
prediction error which is a randomly selected value from a defined distribution in order to
quantity the uncertainty of C.
CI '-C 4' can be written in accordance with Eq.A-6 as below:
C1'=CI *61; C2 C2*62; C3 C3* 3; C4'=C 4 4 (8
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A-7)
New matrices Zi' and Z2' are defined by a linear transformation of the established
matrices of A, B, C, and D as below:
Z1'= zCIA+ z2C2B (A-8a)
Z2'= 3C3C+ 84C4D (A-8b)
The procedure of finding solutions is the exact same as that of a nominal values case.
One of the important characteristics of SRSM is that it can incorporate the parametric
uncertainties using linear transformations of established matrices. Usually, computational
time of linear calculations requires much less than the case of loop calculations. This is
the reason that SRSM is efficient when it needs to calculate a large volume of simulations.
However, SRSM takes additional time compared to direct iterative calculations when it
generates an initial matrix set.
Comparison of Direct Calculation Method and SRSM
A rough comparison of a direct calculation and SRSM may help us understand why
SRSM is efficient and what characteristics SRSM has. Based on our trial calculation, a
direct calculation needs 75-120 loop calculations in order to obtain a solution. Thus, for a
case of 1000 solutions, it needs 75,000 loop calculations. On the other hand, SRSM
requires two stages of calculation. First, if we assume the time of calculation of one
matrix cell is equivalent to that of one loop calculation, SRSM needs the time to perform
200,000 loop calculations to generate a "500 by 400" reference matrix. Second, SRSM
needs 1000 matrix transformations. The time of the matrix transformation is proportional
to the number of matrices that require transformations. Our reference case study has four
matrices, so, if we assume the time of transformation of a matrix is equivalent to that of
loop calculation, SRSM needs additional 4,000 loop calculation. Ultimately, the time to
obtain 1000 solution in SRSM is equivalent to 204,000 loop calculations. For the case of
1000 calculations, the direct calculation is more efficient than SRSM. On the contrary,
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for the case of 10,000 calculations, as shown in Table A-1, SRSM requires 240,000
equivalent loop calculations and a direct calculation demands 750,000 loop calculations.
This shows SRSM is more efficient than a direct calculation for the case of 10,000
calculations for obtaining solutions.
Table A-1 Comparison of a direct calculation and SRSM
number of calculation
number of Direct Calculation SRSM Morenumber of
simulation EfficientResponse surface Method75 calculations Response surface Response surface ethod
. transformation
for a solution (500*400) (4*alcation(4*calculation)
1000 75*1000 200,000 4*1000 DirectDirect
75,000 204,000 Calculation
75*10,000 200,000 4*10,000
10,000 SRSM
750,000 240,000
The result can be different according to the assumptions, the programming method of
direct calculation and initial guesses. And the calculation time of divergence and
oscillation is not taken into consideration for this result.
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Appendix B: Post-accident Human Error
Appendix B presents a detailed analysis of post-accident human error probability of the active and passive designs (Table 4-7).
The THERP method is used and each work referred to data source of THERP handbook [NUREG/CR-1278].
Failure to start the onsite standby EDG during loss of offsite power (1)
- Procedure: Short / Time window: 30 min
- Estimated actual time needed for execution of the procedure: 10 min
- Stress level: High / Recovery by: shift technical advisor and senior reactor operator
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ItemWorkMeanSource
Item Work Mean PSF Table 30A-4 Recovery Modified
No. Description HEP (Item) Factor HEP
1 Failure to respond to one of five alarms 8.0E-03 5 50 4.05E-02 1.62E-03
2 Selection of wrong control to start diesel 1.3E-03 29 4.05E-02 2.63E-0421.3E-03 529 4.05E-02 2.63E-04
generator
3 Omission of step to start diesel generator 1.3E-03 5 8 4.05E-02 2.63E-04
Selection of wrong control to close diesel 1.3E-03 5 29 4.05E-02 2.63E-04
generator circuit breaker
5 Omission of step to close diesel generator 1.3E03 5 8 4.05E-02 2.63E-04
circuit breaker
Total HEP=item 1+ item 2+ item 3+ item 4+ item 5 2.67E-03
Failure to open MOV during shutdown condition (2)
- Procedure: Long
- Time window: 18 min
- Estimated actual time needed for execution of the procedure: 3 min
- Stress level: High
- Recovery by: shift technical advisor and senior reactor operator
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ItemWorkMeanSource
Item Work Mean PSF Table 30A-4 Recovery Modified
No. Description HEP (Item) Factor HEP
1 Failure to respond to one of one alarm 2.7E-04 5 46 4.05E-02 5.47E-05
2 Selection of wrong control for one of 2.6E-03 29 4.05E-02 5.28E-04
MOVs
3 Omission of one step to open MOVs 7.6E-03 5 9 4.05E-02 1.54E-03
Total HEP=item 1+ item 2+ item 3 2.12E-03
Failure to align ARHR during loss of offsite power (3)
- Procedure: Long
- Time window: 20 min
- Estimated actual time needed for execution of the procedure: 15 min
- Stress level: High
- Recovery by: shift technical advisor and senior reactor operator
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Source
Item Work Mean PSF TabSle 30A-4 Recovery Modified
No. Description HEP (Item) Factor HEP
1 Failure to respond to one of three alarms 2.7E-03 5 48 4.05E-02 5.47E-04
2 Examination of wrong equipment status to 1.3E-03 5 29 4.05E-02 2.63E-04
verify pressure level
3 Omission of step to check status of system 3.8E-03 5 9 4.05E-02 7.70E-04
pressure
4 Wrong setting of multi-position switch to 2.7E-03 5 34 4.05E-02 5.47E-04
align ARHR
5 Omission of step to align ARHR 3.8E-03 5 9 4.05E-02 7.73E-04
Total HEP=item 1+ item 2+ item 3+ item 4+ item 5 2.90E-03
Failure to manual transfer of ARHR power (4)
- Procedure: Long
- Time window: 60 min
- Estimated actual time needed for execution of the procedure: 10 min
- Stress level: High
- Recovery by: shift technical advisor and senior reactor operator
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ItemWorkMeanSource
Item Work Mean PSF Table 30A-4 Recovery Modified
No. Description HEP _ (Item) Factor HEP
1 Failure to respond to one of five alarms 8.0E-03 5 50 4.05E-02 1.62E-04
Misreading of RHR system flow 3.7E03 5 17 4.05E-02 750E-04indcaton3.7E-03 17 .  .50E-
indication
3 Omission of step to verify loss of flow 3.8E-03 5 9 4.05E-02 7.OOE-04
from RHR system
4 Selection of wrong control to load RHR 1.3E-03 5 29 4.05E-02 2.63E-04
pump onto diesel generator
5 Omission of step to load RHR pump onto 3.8E-03 5 9 4.05E-02 7.70E-04
diesel generator
Total HEP=item 1+ item 2+ item 3+ item 4+ item 5 4.17E-03
Failure to actuate AOV during loss of offsite power (5)
- Procedure: Long
- Time window: 20 min
- Estimated actual time needed for execution of the procedure: 5 min
- Stress level: High
- Recovery by: shift technical advisor and senior reactor operator
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Source
Item Work Mean PSF Table 30A-4 Recovery Modified
No. Description HEP (Item) Factor HEP
1 Failure to respond to one of three alarms 2.7E-03 5 48 4.05E-02 1.15E-04
2 Selection of wrong control for one-out-of- 1.9E-04 5 29 4.05E-02 8.29E-06
two PRHR AOVs
3 Omission of step to actuate one of AOVs 5.7E-04 5 9 4.05E-02 2.43E-05
Total HEP=item 1+ item 2+ item 3 1.48E-04
Failure to recognize the need of PRHR operation (6)
- Procedure: Long
- Time window: 30 min
- Estimated actual time needed for execution of the procedure: 10 min
- Stress level: Moderate
- Recovery by: shift technical advisor and senior reactor operator
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Source
Item Work Mean PSF Table 30A-4 Recovery Modified
No. Description HEP (Item) Factor HEP
S Failure to respond to one-out-of five 8.0E03 2 50 1.62E-02 2.59E-04
alarms
2 Misreading of steam generator level 3.7E-03 2 17 1.62E-02 1.20E-04
3 Omission step to verify SG level 3.8E-03 2 9 1.62E-02 1.23E-04
Total HEP=item 1 + item 2+ item 3 5.02E-04
Failure to align PRHR during loss of offsite power (7)
- Procedure: Long
- Time window: 30 min
- Estimated actual time needed for execution of the procedure: 15 min
- Stress level: High
- Recovery by: shift technical advisor and senior reactor operator
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Source
Item Work Mean PSF Table 30A-4 Recovery Modified
No. Description HEP _ (Item) Factor HEP
1 Misreading of steam generator level 3.7E-03 5 17 4.05E-02 7.49E-04
2 Omission of step to verify steam generator 3.8E-03 5 9 4.05E-02 7.70E-04
level decreasing
Selection of wrong control to align PRHR 1.3E03 5 29 4.05E-02 2.63E-0431.3E-03 529 4.05 -02 2.63 -04
system
4 Omission of step to align PRHR system 3.8E-03 5 9 4.05E-02 7.70E-04
Total HEP=item 1+ item 2+ item 3+ item 4 2.55E-03
APPENDIX C: Diagnosis Probability Evaluation Model
Appendix C presents the evaluation model of diagnosis probability of post-accident
human error in terms of allowable time.
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Appendix D: Equipment Cost Analysis
Appendix D presents the detailed cost analysis of Table 5-3 and Table 5-4. Five equipment cost analyses are presented: piping,
heat exchanger, pump, valve, and reconfiguration cost of IRWST. Design stage and after startup cost are analyzed respectively.
Pipe Cost Analysis: Short-cut method for piping costs [Ulrich, 20061
Nomenclature Symbol Condition Cost Unit
Implementation in Design Stage 689 $/mBare Module Cost C_BM
Implementation after startup 1,613 $/m
Bare Module insulation Cost C_BM_ins 227 $/m
Base Cost of Material C_P 25.4 cm (12inch), straight-run 110 $/m
Bare Module Installation Factor F_BM 4.2
Material Factor F_M SS304 1.9
Pressure Factor F_P >40 barg 1.6
Modification Factor (After Fielded) F_Mod Modification require 3 times F_BM 3
Pipe diameter D 25.4 cm
Pipe length (one loop) L 50 m
Insulation thickness T_ins 6.35 cm (0.25* 25.4 cm)
F_BM=11.6*DA^-0.84 + 1.13*F_M*F_P
CBM_ins=1.13*T_ins*(D+T_ins)
Design Stage: CBM= F_BM*C_P + C_BM_ins, Piping Cost = $34,450 (one loop)
After Fielded: C_BM= F_BM*C_P*F_Mod + CBM ins, Piping Cost=$80,650 (one loop)
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Nomenclature Symbol Value
Purchased Equipment Cost PEC
Installed Cost IC
Modification Factor (After Fielded) F_Mod 2
Cost Data of Shell and Tube Heat Exchanger
Area(ft^2) Area(m^2) PEC($) IC($) Total($)
2000 186 31,900 95,800 127,700
3000 279 44,700 109,600 154,300
4000 372 53,900 132,900 186,800
5000 465 62,100 141,800 203,900
6000 558 70,800 151,100 221,900
Interpolated PEC ($) = 102*Area (m2) + 14,600
Interpolated IC ($) = 153* Area (m 2) + 69,120
Design Stage: Heat exchanger cost (298.75 m2) = PEC+IC=$160,173
After Fielded: Heat exchanger cost (298.75 m2) = PEC+IC*F_Mod=$274,424
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Heat Exchang·er Cost Analysis: Process EouiPment Cost Estimation TDOE. 20021
Pump Cost Analysis: Process Equipment Cost Estimation [DOE, 20021
Nomenclature Symbol Value
Purchased Equipment Cost PEC
Installed Cost IC
Modification Factor (After Fielded) FMod 1.5
Cost Data of Centrifugal Pump
Capacity(Gallons/minute) PEC ($) IC($) Total Cost($)(Gallons/minute)
1000 8,700 37,500 46,200
2000 10,200 44,800 55,000
3000 15,200 58,100 73,300
4000 19,500 72,300 91,800
5000 23,800 77,100 100,900
Design Stage: Pump cost (3000 Gallons/minute) = PEC+IC=$73,300
After Fielded: Pump cost (3000 Gallons/minute) = PEC+IC*F_Mod=$102,350
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Valve and Emergency diesel generator Cost Analysis: Rough Estimation
AOV and MOV: one third of pump cost
Check valve: one fifth of pump cost
AOV and MOV($) Check Valve($)
Design Stage 24,433 14,600
After Fielded 34,116 20,470
IRWST Reconfiguration [DOE, 20021
Cost Data of Storage Tank
Capacity
Gallons/minute) PEC ($) IC($) Total Cost($)
50,000 157,000 222,440 380,200
60,000 178,377 249,258 427,635
75,000 21 4,800 296,800 511,600
After Fielded: IRWST Reconfiguration Cost (60,000 Gallons/minute) = IC=$249,258
[DOE, 2002]: Process Equipment Cost Estimation DOE/NETL-2002/1169
[Ulrich, 2006]: Ulrich G. D, Vasudevan P.T, Short-Cut Piping Costs, Chemical Engineering, March 2006, p 44-49
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Appendix E: MATLAB (version 7.0) CODE for SRSM
Appendix E presents a representative case of MATLAB code for Stochastic Response
Surface Method. This code consists of four main parts: Matrix (Response Surface)
Generation, Solution Check & Domain Adjustment, Functional Failure Calculation, and
System properties file. In order to increase calculation efficiency, importance sampling
method can be employed using Latin Hypercube calculation.
% Matrix (Response Surface) Generation %
clear all
clc
tic
addpath('C:WMATLAB7WworkWH20_properties');
SystemProperties % SystemProperties load
MF=[1:0.5:250];
Tsys= [100:0.5:330];
for j=1:length(Tsys)
% Constant system properties%
Cmuf(j)=muf(Tsys(j),P);
CBeta(j)=Beta(Tsys(j),P);
CLof(j)=Lof(Tsys(j),P);
CCpf(j)=Cpf(Tsys(j),P);
CKf (j)=Kf(Tsys(j),P);
% MF search
CReHX(j)=DHX/Cmuf(j)/(DareaHX*N_HX);
CReCORE(j)=DCORE/Cmuf(j)/(Darea CORE*N CORE);
CReLP(j)=DLP/Cmuf(j)/DareaLP;
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FrictionHX(j)=0.184*(CReHX(j))^-0.2*LHX/DHX*1.5;% f*L/D :MF missed roughness
3E-3
FormHX=1.8; %0.3
FrictionCORE(j)=0.1529*(CReCORE(j))^-0.2*LCORE/DCORE;
FormCORE=1.5; %0.45
FrictionLP(j)=0.184*(CReLP(j))^-0.2*L_LP/D_LP*1.5;
FormLP=2.85; %2.7
Friction_termHX(j)=FrictionHX(j)/(2*CLof(j)*(DareaHX*NHX)^2); % friction
pressure drop in HX
Friction-termCORE(j)=FrictionCORE(j)/(2*CLof(j)*(D-areaCORE*NCORE)A2); %
friction pressure drop in CORE
FrictiontermLP(j)=FrictionLP(j)/(2*C_Lof(j)*(DareaLP)^2);
Form termHX(j)=FormHX/(2*CLof(j)*(D areaHX*NHX)^2);
FormtermCORE(j)= FormCORE/(2*CLof(j)*(DareaCORE*NCORE)^2);
Form term-LP(j)=Form-LP/(2*CLof(j)*(DareaLP)^2);
C_1 (j)=FormtermLP(j)+FormtermCORE(j)+Form_termHX(j);
C_2(j)=FrictiontermHX(j)+Friction_termCORE(j)+FrictiontermLP(j);
C_3(j)=CBeta(j)*CLof(j)*G*LP_TC;
for i=1 :Iength(MF)
DT_2_Friction(i,j)=C_2(j)*MF(i)^ 1.8/C_3(j);
DT 2_Form(i,j)=Cl (j)*MF(i)^2/C_3(j);
DT_2(i,j)=DTb2jFriction(i,j)+DT_2_Form(i,j);
QFriction(i,j)=CCpf(j)*DT_2_Friction(i,j)*MF(i);
QForm(i,j)=CCpf(j)*DT_2_Form(i,j)*MF(i);
Q(i,j)=CCpf(j)*DT_2(i,j)*MF(i);
% Tsys search
ReHX(i,j)=MF(i)*CReHX(j);
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NuHX(i,j)=0.023*ReHX(i,j)"0.8*Pr^0.35;
hHX(i,j)=NuHX(i,j)*CKf(j)/DHX; % heat transfer co. estimation
DT_1 (i,j)=Q(i,j)/hHX(i,j)/areaHX;
ReCORE(i,j)=MF(i)*CReCORE(j);
NuCORE(i,j)=0.023*ReCORE(i,j)^0.8*Pr^0.35;
hCORE(i,j)=NuCORE(i,j)*CKf(j)/DCORE; % heat transfer co. estimation
DT_3(i,j)=Q(i,j)/hCORE(i,j)/areaCORE;
ReLP(i,j)=MF(i)*CReLP(j);
FrictionFactorHX(i,j)=0.184*(CReHX(j)*MF(i))"-0.2*1.5;
Friction_FactorCORE(i,j)=0.1529*(CReCORE(j)*MF(i))"-0.2;
FrictionFactorLP(i,j)==0.184*(C_ReLP(j)*MF(i))"-0.2* 1.5;
FrictionPressureDropHX(i,j)=FrictiontermHX(j)*MF(i)A1.8;
Friction_PressureDropCORE(i,j)=FrictiontermCORE(j)*MF(i)^1.8;
FrictionPressureDropLP(i,j)=Friction termLP(j)*MF(i)^1.8;
FormPressureDropHX(i,j)=Form_term_HX(j)* M F(i)^2;
FormPressureDropCORE(i,j)=Form_term_CORE(j)*MF(i)^2;
Form_PressureDropLP(i,j)=FormtermLP(j)*M F(i)A2;
TH(i,j)=DT_2(i,j)/2+Tsys(j);
TL(i,j)=Tsys(j)-DT_2(i,j)/2;
TLWE(i,j)=TL(i,j)-DT_1 (i,j);
PTH(i,j)=TL(i,j)+DT_2(i,j)*FdeltaH; % enthalpy rise hot channel factor
end
end
MATTsys= [];
for i=1 :length(MF)
MATTsys= [MATT_sys; Tsys];
end
MATMF=[];
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for i=1 :length(Tsys)
MATMF=[MATMF, MF'];
end
MATCp=[];
for i=1 :length(MF)
MATCp= [MATCp; CCpf];
end
% savefile='MatrixO _01_T JEST. mat';
%save(savefile,
'MF','Tsys','Q','TLWE','PTH','TH','TL',' hHX', CC pf','DT_1 ','DT_2','MATTsys','MATMF
','MATCp');
savefile=' Matrix_01 .mat';
save(savefile);
toc
% Solution Check & Domain Adjustment %
clear all
clc
addpath('C:WMATLAB7WworkWH20_properties');
SystemProperties
load Matrix_01.mat
a=O;b=O;c=O;
[ii,jj]i=find(Q_1 -Q_1 *etaQ <Q & Q<Q_ +Q_1 *etaQ);
b=[ii,jj];
[ii,jj]=find(TLWE_1 -TLWE_ *etaT <TLWE & TLWE<T_LWE_1 +T_LWE_ *etaT);
a=[ii,jj];
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c=intersect(a, b,' rows');
CQ=0;
CMF=0; CTsys=0; CPTH=0;
C-TH=0;CTL=0;CTLWE=0;
ChHX=0;CCCpf=0;
CCReHX=0;CCReCORE=0;CCReLP=0;
CC FricitonFactorHX=O;CCFricitonFactorCORE=0;CCFricitonFactorLP=0;
CCFrictionPDHX=O;CCFrictionPDCORE=O;CC_FrictionPD_LP=0;
CCFormPDHX=0;CCFormPD_CORE=0;CCFormPDLP=0;
for k=1:size(c,1)
CQ(k)=Q(c(k, 1),c(k,2));
CMF(k)=MF(c(k, 1));
CTsys(k)=Tsys(c(k,2));
C_PTH(k)=PTH (c(k,1),c(k,2));
CTH(k)=TH(c(k, 1 ), c(k,2));
C_T_L(k)=TL(c(k, 1 ),c(k,2));
CTLWE(k)=TLWE(c(k, 1),c(k,2));
ChHX(k)= hHX(c(k, 1 ),c(k,2));
CCCpf(k)=CCpf(c(k,2));
C CReHX(k)= ReHX(c(k, 1 ),c(k,2));
CCReCO RE(k)= ReCORE(c(k, 1 ), c(k,2));
CCReLP(k)=ReLP(c(k, 1),c(k,2));
CC_FricitonFactorHX(k)=FrictionFactorHX(c(k, 1),c(k,2));
CCFricitonFactorCORE(k)=FrictionFactorCORE(c(k, 1),c(k,2));
CCFricitonFactorLP(k)=Friction FactorLP(c(k, 1),c(k,2));
CCFrictionPDHX=FrictionPressureDropHX(c(k, 1),c(k,2));
CCFrictionPDCORE=FrictionPressure DropCORE(c(k, 1),c(k,2));
CCFriction PD LP=FrictionPressureDropLP(c(k, 1),c(k,2));
CCFormPDHX=Form_PressureDropHX(c(k, 1 ),c(k,2));
CCForm_PD_CORE=FormPressureDrop CORE(c(k, 1),c(k,2));
CCForm_PD_LP=FormPressureDropLP(c(k, 1),c(k,2));
end
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% finding solution through average of solution cells.
DQ=mean(CQ);
DMF=mean(CMF);
DTLWE= mean(CTLWE);
DTL=mean(CTL);
DTsys=mean(CTsys);
DReHX=mean(CCRe_HX);
DReCORE=mean(CCReCORE);
DReLP=mean(CCReLP);
DFrctionFHX=mean(CCFricitonFactorHX);
DFrctionFCORE=mean(CCFricitonFactorCORE);
DFrctionFLP=mean(CCFricitonFactorLP);
DFrictionPDHX=mean(CCFriction_PD_HX);
DFrictionPDCORE=mean(CCFrictionPDCORE);
DFrictionPDLP=mean(CCFriction_PD_LP);
DFormPDHX=mean(CCFormPDHX);
DFormPD_CORE=mean(CCFormPDCORE);
DFormPDLP=mean(CCFormPDLP);
D_PT_H=mean(CPTH);
D_T_H=mean(CTH);
DhHX=mean(ChHX);
DCpf=mean(CCCpf);
Q_2=DhHX*areaHX*(DTL-DTLWE);
Q_3=DMF*DCpf*(D_T_H-D_TL);
% graphical representation
plot(MF(a(:,1l)),Tsys(a(:,2)),MF(b(:,l )),Tsys(b(:,2)))
hold on
plot([0,2501], [DPTH,DPTH], '-r');
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plot([0,250], [DTH,DTH], '-b');
plot([0,250], [DTsys,DTsys],'-g');
plot([0,250], [DTL,DTL1],'-c');
plot([0,250], [DTLWE,DTLWE],'-k');
hold off
drawnow
ERROR=max(abs((Q_2-Q_1 )/Q_1 *100),abs((Q_3-Q_1)/Q_1 *100));
% display values
disp(")
disp(['Mass Flow Rate =' num2str(DMF) ' kg/s'])
disp(['Enterance Wall Temperature in HX =' num2str(DTLWE) ' C'])
disp(['Lowside Temperature =' num2str(DTL) ' C'])
disp(['System Temperature =' num2str(DTsys) ' C'])
disp(['Highside Temperature =' num2str(DTH) 'C'])
disp(['Hot Spot Temperature in CORE =' num2str(DPTH) ' C'])
disp(['ERROR =' num2str(ERROR)] '%')
disp(['Reynolds
disp(['Reynolds
disp(['Reynolds
disp(['Friction F
disp(['Friction F
disp(['Friction F
number
number
number
actor in
actor in
actor in
in HX =' num2str(DReHX)])
in CORE =' num2str(DReCORE)])
in LOOP =' num2str(DReLP)])
HX =' num2str(DFrctionFHX)])
CORE =' num2str(DFrctionFCORE)])
LOOP =' num2str(DFrctionFLP)])
disp(")
% Functional Failure Calculation %
clear all
clc
tic
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addpath('C:WMATLAB7WworkWH20_properties');
load Matrix 01.mat
SystemProperties
% number of simulation
N=10000;
% stochastic model
RAN 015=random ('normal', 1,0.015, N, 1);
RAN05 =random('normal',1,0.05,N,1);
RAN08 =random('normal',1,0.08,N,1);
RAN10 =random('normal', 1,0.10,N,1);
RAN15 =random('normal', 1,0.15,N,1);
RAN25 =random('normal', 1,0.25,N,1);
RAN50 =random('normal', 1,0.50,N,1);
% Friction & Form loss Uncertainty %
3% error:
10% error:
15% error
20% error
30% error:
50% error:
100% error:
sigma=0.015 :
=0.06 : T_LWE,Q
=0.08 : P ,but T variant 3%
=0.12 : F, K
=0.18 :Nu
=0.60
commercial steel roughness is 4.5E-5, therefore relative roughness is
4.5E-5/DHX(0.0157)=0.003, friction factor will be about two times of
the smooth case
RANFriction=RAN25;
RANForm=RAN25;
% Heat rate Uncertainty %
%20%
RANQ=RAN10;
% Cold temperature Uncertainty %
% 10%
RAN_TLWE=RAN08;
% Nu uncertainty %
RANNu=RAN 15;
172
% pressure uncertainty
RANP=RAN05;
CC=0;
for m=l :N
QMod=Q*RANjFriction(m);% Friction and From uncertainty
TLWEMod=MATTsys- 1/2*DT_2*RANFriction(m)-
DT_1*RANFriction(m)/RANNu(m);%Friction and Form and Nu uncertainty
h_HXMod=hHX*RANNu(m);% Nu uncertainty
TL Mod=QMod./hHX_Mod/areaHX+TLWE_Mod;
DT 2 Mod=DT 2*RANFriction(m);
a=0;b=0;c=0;
[ii,jj] =find(Q_1 *RANQ(m)-Q1 *RANQ(m)*etaQ<QMod&
QMod<Q_ *RANQ(m)+Q_1 *RANQ(m)*etaQ);
b=[ii,jj];
[ii,jj]=find(TLWE_1 *RAN TLWE(m)-RANTLWE(m)*etaT<TLWEMod&
TLWE_Mod<RANLT-LWE(m)+RANTLWE(m)*etaT);
a=[ii,jj]
c=intersect(a,b,'rows');
CQMod=0;CTLWEMod=0;
CMF=0;CT-sys=0;
CTL Mod=0;CDT_2_Mod=0;
C_T_H=0;CPTH=0;ChHX=0;CCCpf=0;
for k=1:size(c,1)
CQMod(k)=QMod(c(k, 1),c(k,2));
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C_T_LWE_Mod(k)=TLWE_Mod(c(k, 1),c(k,2));
C_MF(k)=MF(c(k,1));
CTsys(k)=Tsys(c(k,2));
CTLMod(k)=TLMod(c(k, 1),c(k,2));
CDT_2_Mod(k)=DT_2_Mod(c(k, 1),c(k,2));
% CPTH(k)=PTHMod(c(k,1),c(k,2));
% CTH(k)=T_H_Mod(c(k,1),c(k,2));
end
D_MF(m)=mean(CMF);
D_T_sys(m)=mean(CTsys);
DQ(m)=mean(CQMod);
D_T_LWE(m)=mean(CTLWEMod);
D_T_L(m)=mean(CTLMod);
D_DT_2(m)=mean(CDT_2_Mod);
D_T_H(m)=DTL(m)+DDT_2(m);
D_PT_H(m)=DTL(m)+DDT_2(m)*FdeltaH;
% plot(MF(a(:, 1)),Tsys(a(:,2)),MF(b(:,1 )),Tsys(b(:,2)))
%
% hold on
% v=[0,300,100,350];
% axis(v)
% plot([0,2501, [FailureLimit*RANP(m),FailureLimit*RANP(m)],'-rx');
% plot([0,250], [DPTH(m),DPTH(m)],'-m');
% plot([0,250] ,[DTH(m),DTH(m)], '-b');
% plot([0,2501, [ DTsys(m),DTsys(m)] ,'-g');
% plot([0,2501, [DTL(m),DTL(m)],'-c');
% plot([0,2501, [DTLWE(m),DTLWE(m)] ,'-k');
% plot( [DMF(m),DMF(m)], [ 100,FailureLimit*RANP(m)] ,'-g');
%
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hold off
drawnow
ERROR(m)=abs(Q_1-DQ(m)/Q_1 *100);
if(DPTH(m)>FailureLimit*RANP(m))
CC=CC+1;
end
end
Prob=CC/N;
disp(['Failure Probability =' num2str(Prob)])
toc
disp(")
disp(['Mass Flow Rate = ' num2str(DMF) ' kg/s'])
disp(['Enterance Wall Temperature in HX =' num2str(DTLWE) ' C'])
disp(['Lowside Temperature =' num2str(DTL) ' C'])
disp(['System Temperature =' num2str(DTsys) ' C'])
disp(['Highside Temperature =' num2str(DTH) ' C'])
disp(['Hot Spot Temperature in CORE =' num2str(DPTH) ' C'])
disp(['ERROR =' num2str(ERROR) ' C'])
disp(")
%
% System properties file %
addpath('C:WMATLAB7WworkWH20_properties')
% % Degradation Uncertainty Parameter
% mul=0;
% sil=0.3; % original 0.5
% mu2=0;
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% si2=0.2; % original 0.2
% mu3=0;
% si3=0.3; % original 0.5
%
% % Epistemic Uncertainty Parameter
% minHX=0.8; % original 0.7 50% deviation mapping normal
% maxHX=1.2; % original 1.3
% muR=0; % Iognormal distribution R
% siR=0.2; % original 0.3
% minCORE=0.8; % original 0.7 50% deviation mapping normal
% maxCORE=1.2; % original 1.3
%
% % Failure criterion
FailureLimit=343; % boiling point of 15 MPa
%
% % TH factors
FdeltaH= .65; % Enthalphy rise factors
% FQN=2.60; % Hot channel factors
% Universal constants
G=9.8;
Pr=0.835;% Prantle # (refer to 15MPa)
% TH properties
P=15;% system pressure
% Geometry properties
% 2. Heat exchanger geometry
DHX=0.0157; % original AP600 design 0.0157
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L_HX=12.12; % tube length of HX, AP1000 is 14.43
DareaHX=3.14*D_HX^2/4; % HX diameter
NHX=500; % # of channel
areaHX=2*3.14*D_HX/2*NHX*LHX; % total heat transfer area
% 1. Loop geometry
DLP=0.254; % diameter of loop pipe[m]
DareaLP=3.14*(DLP)A2/4; % cross section of loop pipe[m^2]
LPTC=15;% thermal center height [m] design value: 10 m
LLP=2*LPTC+30-(LHX-2.12);% length of loop[m]: reference value: 50m
% 3. Reactor core geometry
DCORE=0.012;
%De=4*(P^2-D^2*3.14/4)/(3.14*D)=4*(12.6^2-9.5^2*3.14/4)/(3.14*9.5)=0.0117
LCORE=4; % 4m form 312 p13
DareaCORE=(3.14*D_COREA2)/4;% (3.14*0.012^2)/4
NCORE=55777/2;% 17*17*193 (312 p31) 1000MWe CORE
areaCORE=3.14*D_CORE*LCORE*N_CORE; % 3.14*0.012*4*55777*0.5
% 4. Operating conditions and their ranges
etaT=0.01; % allowable range for TLW (standard:0.5)
etaQ=0.01; % allowable range for Q (standard:0.02) 0.04 is appropriate
T_LWE_1=150; % Well temperature of HX
Q_1=5.5E7; % Heat generation rate 30M for AP600 (38min), 50M for AP1000 (40min)
% Latin Hypercube Calculation%
% Assumption: 15 MPa, One Phase heat transfer through natural circulation
clear all
clc
addpath('C:WMATLAB7WworkWH20_properties')
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plotoption=0;
tic
load 2Dsimulationver8.mat
SystemProperties_2D_verl
% Matrix Arrangement
MATMF=[];
for i=1 :length(TL)
MATMF=[MATMF, MF'];
end
MATTL=[];
for i=1 :Iength(MF)
MATTL= [MATTL; TL];
end
MATCp= [];
for i=1 :length(MF)
MATCp= [MATCp; Cpf(TL,P)];
end
MATPBsys=[];
for i=1 :length(MF)
MATPBsys=[MATPBsys; PBsys];
end
count=0;
for ii=100:100 % general 100:100, convergence check 1:100
count=count+1;
N=ii*10;
% Latin hypercube sample for biased uncertainty
[comb,x 1 ,x2,x3,x4,corl 2,cor23,cor34,cor41 ] =biasedepistemic(muFHX,siFHX,muF
CORE,siFCORE, muNHX,siNHX,muNCORE,siNCORE, N);
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% Latin hypercube sample for unbiased uncertainty----------------
[vcomb,vxl ,vx2,vx3,vx4,vcorl 2,vcor23,vcor34,vcor41 ] =unbiasedepistemic(minFHX,
maxFHX,minFCORE,maxFCORE,minNHX,maxNHX,minNCORE,maxNCORE,N);
DT HW=O;DTH=O;CC=O;a=O;b=O;c=O %initialization
success=[]; failure=[];% success and failure space matrix
for s=l :N
% unceratain values consolidation
EFHX(s)=vcomb(1,s)*comb(1,s); % HX Friction factor uncertainty (0.8-2.0)
EFCORE(s)=vcomb(2,s)*comb(2,s);
ENHX(s)=vcomb(3,s)/comb(3,s); % HX Nusselt number uncertainty (0.5-1.1)
ENCORE(s)=vcomb(4,s)/comb(4,s); % CORE Nusselt number uncertainty
(0.5-1.1)
% Matrix change with respect to uncertainty
NDelT=(EFHX(s)*PDHX+EFCORE(s)*PDCORE)./MATPBsys;
NQ=MATMF.*MATCp.*N_DelT; % Searching condition
N-hHX=ENHX(s)*hHX;
N TLW=MATTL-NQ./NhHX/areaHX; % Searching condition
NTH=MATTL+NQ./MATMF./MATCp;
N h CORE=ENCORE(s)*hCORE;
NTHW=NT H+NQ./NhCORE/areaCORE;
% Matrix mapping with respect to conditions---------------------------
[iii,jjj]=find(Q_1*(1-etaQ) < NQ & NQ < Q_1*(1+etaQ));
b=[iii,jjj];
[iii,jjj]=find((TLW_1-etaT)< NTLW & N_T_LW < (T_LW_I+eta_T));
a=[iii,jjj];
c=intersect(a,b,'rows');
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plot (MF(a(:, 1)),TL(a(:,2)),MF(b(:, 1)),TL(b(:,2)))
drawnow
C T L=0;C T H=0;C T HW=0; % initialization
for i=1:size(c,1)
% temperature nodes
% CjT LW(i)=N TLW(c(i,1),c(i,2));
% Ch HX=Nh HX(c(i,1),c(i,2));
% CReHX=ReHX(c(i, 1 ),c(i,2));
% C-hCORE=NhCORE(c(i,1),c(i,2));
% CRe_CORE=ReCORE(c(i,1),c(i,2));
% CMF=MF(c(i,1));
CTL=TL(c(i,2));
CTH = NTH (c(i, 1 ),c(i,2));
CT HW=N TjHW(c(i,1),c(i,2));
end
DTL(s)=mean (CTL);
DTH(s)=mean(CTH);
DTHW(s)=mean(CTHW);
% searching peak values
PTH (s)=DTL(s)+(DTH (s)-DTL(s))*FdeltaH;
PTHW(s)=PTH(s)+(DTHW(s)-DTH(s))*F_QN;
% Failure judgement
if(PTH(s)>FailureLimit)
CC=CC+1;
failure= [failure;EF_HX(s),EFCORE(s),ENHX(s), ENCORE(s)];
else
success= [success;EFHX(s),EFCORE(s),ENHX(s), ENCORE(s) ];
end
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if size(success, 1 )*size(failure, 1 )>0
if plotoption==1
figure(I)
plot3 (success(:, 1),success(:,3),success(:,4),'o')
hold on
plot3 (failure(:, 1),failure(:,3),failure(:,4),'rx')
hold off
drawnow
end
end
end
Nsize(count)=N;
P_LHS=CC/N;% when measuring
meanPLHS(ii)=mean(PLHS(ii,:));
the conversion,
% figure(2)
plot (Nsize, meanPLHS)
drawnow
end
disp([num2str(N),' ', num2str(P_LHS)])
% corl2,cor23,cor31
% vcorl 2,vcor23,vcor31
% Biased Function Programming%
function [comb,x1 ,x2,x3,x4,corl 2,cor23,cor34,cor41 ] =biasedepistemic(muFHX,siFHX,m
u_FCORE,siFCORE,muNHX,siNHX,muNCORE,siNCORE,N)
for jj=1 :N % Latin Hypercube Sampling
xl rand=unidrnd(10001,1,1)/10000-0.0001;
Latin_P1 (jj)=0.5/N*((jj-1 )+xl rand);
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P_LHS(ii,kk) and
xl (jj)=Ilogninv(LatinP1 (jj),muFHX,siFHX);
x2rand=unidrnd(10001,1,1)/1 0000-0.0001;
LatinP2(jj)=0.5/N*((jj-1 )+x2rand);
x2(jj)=logninv(LatinP2(jj),mu2,si2);
x3rand=unidrnd(10001,1,1)/10000-0.0001;
LatinP3(jj)=0.5/N*((jj-1 )+x3rand);
x3(jj)=logninv(LatinP3(jj),mu3,si3);
x4rand=unidrnd(10001,1,1)/10000-0.0001;
LatinP4(jj)=0.5/N*((jj- 1 )+x4rand);
x4(jj)=logninv(LatinP4(jj),mu4,si4);
end
corl2=1;cor23=1 ;cor34=1;cor41=1;
while corl2>0.2 I cor23>0.2 I cor34>0.2 I cor34>0.2
xl p=randperm(size(xl ,2));
x2p=randperm(size(x2,2));
x3p=randperm(size(x3,2));
x4p=randperm(size(x4,2));
corrl 2=corrcoef(xl p,x2p);
corr23=corrcoef(x2p,x3p);
corr34=corrcoef(x3p,x4p);
corr4l =corrcoef(x4p,x 1 p);
cor12=abs(corrl 2(1,2));
cor23=abs(corr23(1,2));
cor34=abs(corr34(1,2));
cor41=abs(corr41(1,2));
end
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comb= [x 1 (xl p);x2(x2p);x3(x3p);x4(x4p)] ;
% Unbiased Function Programming%
function [vcomb,vxl ,vx2,vx3,vx4,vcorl 2,vcor23,vcor34,vcor41 ]= unbiasedepistemic(minF
HX,maxFHX,minFCORE,maxFCORE,minNHX,maxNHX,minNCORE,maxNCORE,N)
for jj=1 :N % Latin Hypercube Sampling
xl rand=unidrnd(10001,1,1)/10000-0.0001;
LatinP1 (jj)= 1/N*((jj-1 )+xl rand);
xxi (jj)=norminv(LatinP1 (jj),0, 1);% standard normal
vxl (jj)=(1 ./(1 +exp(-xxl (jj))))*(maxFHX-min_FHX)+minFHX;% mapping within min and
max
x2rand=unidrnd(10001,1,1 )/10000-0.0001;
LatinP2(jj)= 1/N*((jj- 1 )+x2rand);
xx2(jj)=norminv(LatinP2(jj),0, 1 );% standard normal
vx2(jj)=(1 ./(1 +exp(-xx2(jj))))*(maxFCORE-minFCORE)+minFCORE;% mapping
within min and max
x3rand=unidrnd(10001,1,1)/10000-0.0001;
LatinP3(jj)=1/N*((jj-1 )+x3rand);
xx3(jj)=norminv(LatinP3(jj),0, 1 );% standard normal
vx3(jj)=(1 ./(1 +exp(-xx3(jj))))*(maxNHX-min_NHX)+minN HX;
x4rand=unidrnd(10001,1,1)/10000-0.0001;
LatinP4(jj)=1/N*((jj-1 )+x4rand);
xx4(jj)=norminv(LatinP4(jj),0, 1 );% standard normal
vx4(jj)=(1./(1 +exp(-xx4(jj))))*(maxNCORE-min_NCORE)+minNCORE;
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end
vcorl 2=1;vcor23=1;vcor34=1;vcor4l =1;
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